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Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse
and the Statute of Limitations:
The Need for Consistent Application of
the Delayed Discovery Rule
Adults have more power than chidren .... Children are essentially a captive
population, totally dependent upon their parents or other adults for their basic
needs. Thus they will do whatever they perceive to be necessary to preserve a
relationship with their caretakers .... [T]he final choice in the matter of sexual
relations between adults and children rests with the adult.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The disturbing phenomenon of childhood sexual abuse' in this country
has long been downplayed, ignored, and even denied.' However, millions
of American women, as well as men, have been its victims,4 and the num-
ber of cases reported each year is on the rise.5 For the most part, the
1. JUDITH L HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 27 (1980).
2. For purposes of this Comment, "childhood sexual abuse" is broadly defined as
any kind of exploitative sexual contact, attempted sexual contact, or sexual interac-
tion between a child under the age of 18 and any adult, including a parent, steppar-
ent, guardian, or other person in a position of trust and authority. An expansive defi-
nition of childhood sexual abuse is adopted to protect all children from any harmful
contact by adults seeking sexual gratification.
This Comment uses the term "childhood sexual abuse" in place of the term
"incest." The word "incest" implies a fear of in-breeding among closely related indi-
viduals rather than accurately depicting the full range of physical and psychological
effects of childhood sexual abuse. Alan Rosenfeld, The Statute of Limitations Barrier
in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: The Equitable Estoppel Remedy, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S
LJ. 206, 206 n.2 (1989).
3. JEFFREY J. HAUGAARD & N. DICKON REPuccI, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 2-3
(1988).
4. In this Comment the victim of childhood sexual abuse will be referred to as a
female. This reference serves solely a literary function and is not intended to imply
that sexual victimization of males is less disturbing or damaging than abuse of fe-
males or that men are less deserving of civil remedies.
5. Tina M. Whitehead, Application of The Delayed Discovery Rule: The Only Hope
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steps taken by courts and legislatures to remedy this social crisis have
been inadequate.' Current laws are ineffective at punishing child sex
offenders and deterring future abuse, and they provide victims with little
relief or support. In response to this, an increasing number of survivors
of childhood sexual abuse have taken matters into their own hands by
filing civil lawsuits against their abusers, seeking monetary compensation
for their injuries
Unfortunately, victims of childhood sexual abuse are often unable to
file lawsuits until many years after the abuse has ended.' Children who
are sexually abused often suffer severe psychological and emotional dam-
age that may not become manifest until adulthood Others develop an
arsenal of defense mechanisms and may repress memory of the abuse
for an extended period of time.'0
Because of the frequent delay in filing a cause of action, state statutes
of limitations pose serious procedural obstacles to recovery." Preclu-
sion of their claims by the statute of limitations effectively denies adult
survivors of childhood sexual abuse the only compensatory remedy avail-
for Justice for Sexual Abuse Survivors, 16 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 153, 154 n.4 (1992)
(noting an overwhelming increase in the number of childhood sexual abuse cases
reported annually between 1976 and 1986). For a statistical picture of the childhood
sexual abuse problem, see infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
6. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 164-67 (discussing the inadequacy of criminal penal-
ties in deterring childhood sexual abuse). For further discussion on this topic, see
infra notes. 55-63 and accompanying text.
7. Carol L Mithers, Incest and the Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1990, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 44 (reporting that a growing number of survivors of childhood sexual abuse
have filed civil lawsuits against their abusers in the past decade). For a discussion of
the multiple benefits an adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse derives from filing
a civil lawsuit, see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text
8. Kelli L. Nabors, The Statute of Limitations: A Procedural Stumbling Block in
Civil Incestuous Abuse Suits, 14 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 159 (1990) (reporting that
it often takes several years of therapy before a survivor of childhood sexual abuse is
able to fie a civil lawsuit against her abuser). For a discussion of how childhood
sexual abuse impairs an adult survivor's ability to timely file a civil lawsuit, see infra
notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
9. See generally DAVID FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 144-64
(1986) (reviewing the empirical literature on both the initial and long-term effects of
childhood sexual abuse on the survivor). For further discussion of the long term
emotional and psychological consequences of childhood sexual abuse, see infra notes
40-44 and accompanying text
10. For a discussion of the phenomenon of "repression" or "memory loss" among
adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse, see ifra notes 45-47 and accompanying
text.
11. Statutes of limitations are legislatively mandated time limits which restrict the
period during which civil suits may be fied after the date of injury. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 (1977). For amore detailed discussion of statutes of limita-
tions, see inqfa notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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able for the injuries they suffered as a result of their childhood victimiza-
tion.
Recently, a number of courts have recognized the harsh consequences
of a strict application of the statute of limitations and have applied the
delayed discovery rule, a common law equitable exception to strict ad-
herence to the time bar that statute of limitations present.' The discov-
ery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows, or rea-
sonably should have known, of her injury. However, judicial expansion of
the rule into the area of childhood sexual abuse has been inconsistent
and erratic."
This Comment analyzes the dynamics of childhood sexual abuse and
its damaging effects on its victims. It argues that survivors of childhood
sexual abuse currently lack an adequate legal remedy for the harm they
experience. Part 1 of this Comment addresses the dynamics and devas-
tating psychological consequences of childhood sexual abuse.14 Part Im
explores the legal measures courts are taking in response to the child-
hood sexual abuse problem. 5 Part IV focuses on the policy consider-
ations behind statutes of limitations and traces the history of the discov-
ery rule." Part V surveys the conflicting approaches courts take in ap-
plying the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases. Part VI ex-
plores the legislative response to the statute of limitations problem in
civil childhood sexual abuse cases and proposes a legislative solution for
future legislation.8 Finally, this Comment concludes that because courts
have failed to uniformly apply the discovery rule in an equitable fashion,
uniform legislation must be introduced so that justice will be served for
all victims of childhood sexual abuse.
II. THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
Historically, society has responded to charges of childhood sexual
abuse with skepticism and disbelief." Leading scholars in the fields of
12. See, e.g., Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). For further
discussion of this case, see infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text. For a detailed
discussion of the discovery rule, see infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the judicial application of the discovery rule to childhood
sexual abuse cases, see infa notes 124-213 and accompanying text.
14. See inifo text accompanying notes 19-54.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 55-72.
16. See intm text accompanying notes 73-123.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 124-213.
18. See iqfra text accompanying notes 214-79.
19. HAUGAARD & REPPucci, supra note 3, at 148-51. Prior to the 1960s, children's
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psychology' and law2' pioneered a tradition of discounting such re-
ports as fantasies and falsehoods. For much of the twentieth century,
American society refused to acknowledge the prevalence and severity of
childhood sexual abuse.'
In the 1970s, public awareness about the sexual victimization of chil-
dren began to increase, largely due to the efforts of feminists and child
advocates.' In the past decade, growing concern over the childhood
sexual abuse problem has sparked extensive debate and research into
the scope, impact, and treatment of this social malady."
reports of sexual abuse were rarely believed when denied by the alleged perpetrator.
Id. at 149. Until recently, the public has held a firm belief that childhood sexual
abuse is extremely uncommon and that children's reports of sexual encounters with
adults are untrustworthy. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 22.
20. Id. at 9-11. Early in his career, Sigmund Freud theorized that the origin of
every case of female hysteria (the most common female neurosis of Freud's time)
was childhood sexual trauma. Id, at 9. However, unwilling to accept what his conclu-
sions implied about the behavior of respected family men, Freud repudiated his
theory a year after publishing it. Id. at 9-10. He determined that his patients had
been lying, and their numerous reports of sexual assaults were untrue. Id. at 10.
Freud concluded that the reports of sexual abuse were fantasies, which he attributed
to his patients' own incestuous wishes. Id,
21. Id at 11 (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1934)). John Henry
Wigmore established a doctrine discrediting women and children who complained of
sexual abuse. Id. In his famous treatise, "Wigmore warned that women and girls were
predisposed to bring false accusations against men of good character, and that these
accusations might convince unsuspecting judges and juries." Id.
22. DIANA E.H. RussEa, THE SECRET TRAUMA INCEST IN THE IVES OF Gnus AND
WOMEN 3-9 (1986). The author documents a long history among researchers in the
fields of psychology and social anthropology of discounting and even ignoring the
experiences of sexually abused children. Id.
A recent example of society's continued reluctance to acknowledge the reality of
childhood sexual abuse involves the public's negative reaction to allegations of sexual
abuse made against the popular music star, Michael Jackson. See Cathleen McGuigan
et al., Michael's World, NEwSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1993, at 35, 35; Amy Wallace and Jim
Newton, AUred Calls Jackson's Accuser 'Courageous', LA. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1993, at BI.
Throughout the pendency of the police investigation conducted by the Los Angeles
Police Department, the public at large rallied to Jackson's defense assuming that his
world-wide popularity and youth-targeted philanthropy preclude him from being a
potential child abuser. See PEOPLE, Sept. 27, 1993, at 4, 4 (letters to the editor).
Whether or not the allegations made against Michael Jackson are true, the American
public's immediate and overwhelming support of Michael Jackson demonstrates that
society is more inclined to discredit children and ignore allegations of sexual abuse
than to accept the reality that hundreds of thousands of children are sexually abused
each year.
23. RussELL, supra note 22, at 4-5. Feminist scholars helped society to recognize
and condemn the widespread sexual victimization of women and raised public aware-
ness regarding pornography, rape, and incest. Id.; see also HAUGARRD & REPPUCCI, 81-
pra note 3, at 3 (citing FINKELHOR, supra note 9, at 15).
24. See HAUGARRD & REPPUCCI, supra note 3, at 3-5 (describing the recent explo-
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The statistics on childhood sexual abuse are startling. Recent studies
estimate that millions of women in this country have been sexually
abused,' and at least 200,000 new cases are reported each year.' Ex-
perts believe that as many as one in three American females and one in
six males are sexually abused during childhood.'
A. Dynamics of Childhood Sexual Abuse
The most prevalent myth about child sexual abuse is that its perpetra-
tors are strangers who appear from the shadows in search of young vic-
tims.' However, in reality, sexual abuse is most frequently committed
by family members or other adults who occupy positions of trust and au-
thority in relation to the child.' Typically, the abuser will exploit the
power imbalance inherent in adult-child relationships to dominate the
child.' Child abusers often initiate and maintain sexual access to the
sion of interest in and concern about child sexual abuse among psychologists, social
workers, lawyers, legislators, the media, and medical and mental health professionals).
25. Mithers, supra note 7, at 44 (reporting that an estimated 12 to 15 million
women in this country were sexually abused during childhood).
26. BIL1E W. DZIECH & JUDGE CHARLES B. SCHuDsoN, ON TRIAL: AMERICA'S COURTS
AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 1 (1989). In 1984, more than
200,000 cases of child sexual abuse were reported to authorities. Id, In 1991, more
than 120,00 children in Los Angeles County alone were sexually or physically abused,
representing an eleven percent increase from the previous year. Anne C. Roark, More
Children Are Victims of Violence, Studies Find, LA. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at Al.
27. KATHLEEN C. FALLER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD SEXUAL MALTREATMENT 13 (1990);
DZiECH & SCHUDSON, supra note 26, at 1.
28. Kee MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children, in THE VICTMIZATION OF WOMEN
81, 86 (Jane R. Chapman & Margaret Gates eds., 1978). The author points out that by
alerting children to beware of strangers offering rides or candy, adults address only a
small percentage of the actual population that poses a sexual threat to children. Id.
In reality, "(C]hild abusers look and act pretty much like everybody else. Many of
them are men and women with jobs and families, liked by their coworkers and
neighbors and respected in their communities .... " JOHN CREWDSON, BY SILENCE
BETRAYED 55 (1988).
29. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 7. The most common child sexual abusers are fa-
thers, stepfathers, uncles, cousins, family friends, and neighbors. Id. Furthermore, the
closer the relationship of the abuser to the child, the less likely the child will report
the abuse and the greater the likelihood that it will continue. SANDRA BUTLER, CON-
SPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST 12 (1978).
30. See MacFarlane, supra note 28, at 88. Children are susceptible targets since
they are in subordinate positions and have been conditioned to comply with authori-
ty. Id. Thus, "[c]hildren by their very nature make ideal victims of sexual exploita-
tion." Id.
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child through an atmosphere of secrecy and shame.3 ' Although the child
victim often senses that what is happening is not right, the child will
often tell no one about the relationship, thereby allowing the victimiza-
tion to continue for a significant period of time.'
Many factors combine to keep the sexually abusive relationship intact.
In many cases, the sexual activity, although inappropriate, may be the
child's only perceived source of love, attention, and affection.' Some
victims receive tangible rewards such as money or gifts in exchange for
submitting to the adults' wishes.' Frequently, the perpetrator frightens
the child into maintaining the secrecy with threats of harm or other neg-
ative consequences.' In light of these conditions, child victims often are
unable to disengage themselves from the abuse, and they are slowly con-
ditioned into a pattern of submission and silence which allows the abuse
to continue over an extended period of time.' Such behavior often
causes the child to develop feelings of helplessness and guilt or responsi-
bility for having let the abuse go on for so long, which in turn, further
prevent the child from breaking the silence.'
31. Jocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: To-
ward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE J. 2189,
2192 (1991) (citing BUTLER, supra note 29, at 30-31). Because the perpetrator is
commonly known and trusted by the child, the sexual encounters are rarely asso-
ciated with violence or threat of force. MacFarlane, supra note 28, at 88. "Rarely is
it necessary to intimidate a child who already is trusting and open to the adults in
his or her family environment." BUTLER, supra note 29, at 29.
32. BUTLER, supra note 29, at 30-31. "These children submerge their true feelings,
distrust their perceptions, and deny their own reality. They tell no one about the
relationship and behave as though nothing is happening." Id. at 30.
33. MacFarlane, supra note 28,. at 88-89. Children are "sensual beings who may
respond willingly to intimate and gentle contact which they may associate with feel-
ings of being loved, cherished, and cared for." Id. at 88. For some children, the
"sexual abuse "represents the first time they experience what they perceive to be
recognition'of special attention from the parent or parent figure. As is the case with
some battered children, even negative, painful, or distasteful attention is better than
none at all." Id. at 88-89.
34. BUTLER, supra note 29, at 29-30.
35. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 88. Many children are warned not to report the
sexual abuse and are threatened with severe consequences if they do. Id. These con-
sequences could include: parental divorce, mental suffering by the non-guilty parent,
incarceration of the guilty parent, the child being punished and sent away from
home, and physical harm. Id.
36. BUTLER, supra note 29, at 33. For example, a woman gave the following rea-
son for keeping silent "Nobody would have believed me. Daddy was a big execu-
tive .... I never felt anyone would believe a kid saying anything like that I didn't
feel I had anyplace to turn and just waited for the day I turned sixteen so I could
leave all of them behind me." Id.
37. A 15-year-old survivor of sexual abuse stated:
I used to get extra things from Daddy for being nice to him. He told me
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B. The Psychological Ijuries of Childhood Sexual Abuse
The damaging effects of childhood sexual abuse can be significant
both initially and long-term.' During childhood, the consequences of
sexual abuse include feelings of anger, guilt, shame, low self-esteem, and
depression."' In the long term, adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse
continue to experience emotional effects similar to those endured as
children; however, the consequences for adults are often more serious.'
Adults who were sexually victimized during childhood often experience
sexual dysfunction, chronic depression, and have difficulty forming inti-
mate personal relationships." Adult survivors are also more likely to
abuse alcohol or drugs, attempt suicide,' or suffer from an eating dis-
never to tell anybody and he would keep on giving me things, like extra
spending money. I was only nine when he started, and I liked getting those
presents. I didn't like what I had to do to get them, but it was the only
spending money I ever got. He never hurt me, and it didn't take too long, so
I would just not let myself think it was happening at all. After a while I
started to worry all the time and was afraid of anybody finding out. But I
had let it go on for so many years without telling anyone, I was afraid peo-
ple would think it was my fault. So I never told.
Id, at 30.
38. See FINKELNOR, supra note 9, at 143. The literature maintains that childhood
sexual abuse can play an important role in the development of serious emotional,
physical, sexual, and social problems. Id. at 143-44. Adult survivors commonly display
signs of depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem in addition to engaging in self-de-
structive behaviors such as drug and alcohol abuse, eating disorders, and suicide. Id,
at 144-64.
39. Id. at 149-50.
40. Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Adult Suruivors
of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L REv. 355, 359 (1991).
41. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 93. In her study of 40 female survivors of childhood
sexual abuse, Dr. Judith Herman concluded that 6096 experienced major depression
symptoms during their adult lives. Id. at 99. Moreover, 55% of the women suffered
from sexual dysfunction including impairment of sexual. enjoyment. Id. at 93. The
study concluded that each of these percentages was higher for the group of adult
survivors of sexual abuse than for the comparison group. Id.
42. Id at 93, 99. Dr. Herman's study finds that 3896 of the women who were
sexually abused as children attempted suicide. Id, at 99. In addition, 20% were either
alcohol or drug dependent at some point in their life. Id, These percentages were all
consistently higher among sexually abused women in comparison to the control group
of non-sexually abused women. Id. at 93.
Women who were sexually abused as children have also been targeted as a high
risk group for contracting the HIV virus, which can lead to AIDS. The increased risk
factor can possibly be explained by the disproportionately high rate of sexual pro-
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order.' Furthermore, adults who were sexually abused as children have
a strong tendency to perpetuate the cycle of abuse by victimizing their
own children.4M
Many survivors of childhood sexual abuse do not realize the harmful
consequences of the abuse until years after the abuse has ended.' Child
victims often develop a combination of coping mechanisms that enable
them to withstand the emotional trauma they experience. Behavioral
responses such as denial, dissociation, repression, and amnesia are vital
to the child's survival during the period of abuse.'7 Usually, the child
continues to employ these defense mechanisms well into adulthood.
Experts have found these psychological and emotional reactions to be
so strilingly common among sexually abused children they have labeled
this collective response "Post-Incest Syndrome. ' Post-Incest Syndrome
may prevent the survivor from initiating a cause of action by causing her
to minimize or deny the effects of the abuse almost completely so that
misculty and drug abuse among adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. See
FINKELHOR, supra note 9, at 160-61 (reporting that an increase in the level of sexual
behavior or activity among victims is a common long-term effect of childhood sexual
abuse).
43. For example, Carmen, a survivor of childhood sexual abuse, stated:
My weight still is the central physical manifestation of my incest experiences.
All that extra flesh is the separation I need between myself and my sexual
feelings. I don't trust my feelings, and if I can keep myself fat and unattrac-
tive, I don't need to deal with them at all. My weight also is the source of
my power and protection against feeling small and vulnerable, like I was as
a skinny little kid of eleven.
BUTLER, supra note 29, at 21-22.
See also FINKELEOR, supra note 9, at 155 (finding support in the literature for the
proposition that eating disorders may be a more common long-term effect of childhood
sexual abuse than is currently acknowledged).
44. See JEAN RENvOIZE, INcESr. A FAMILY PATrERN 90 (1982) (demonstrating that
survivors of childhood sexual abuse have a strong tendency to either abuse their own
children, or permit others to do so, thus perpetuating the cycle of abuse).
45. Mithers, supra note 7, at 44.
46. See Lamm, supra note 31, at 2193.
47. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 208. The severity of these responses is often affect-
ed by such factors as the age of the child when the abuse began, the length of time
that the abuse continued, and the level of violence used during the abuse. Id, at 208-
09.
48. I& A critical component of the Post-Incest Syndrome is Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (MTSD). Id. at 209. PTSD Is a clinically diagnosed disorder where the mem-
ory of a psychologically unacceptable experience is partially or completely repressed
due to the survivor's Inability to cope with the trauma. AmERICAN PSYCMATRIC AssOCI-
ATION, DIAGNOSTC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOmRERS § 309.89, at 247 (3d
ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-IlI-R] (1The essential feature of this disorder is the
development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically traumatic event
that is generally outside the range of usual human experience.").
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she is unable to connect the sexual abuse with any later consequences.'
Typically, it is only through a triggering event such as psychotherapy that
a survivor is able to overcome the psychological layers of repression to
discover the causal connection between her present injuries and the past
abuse.' Unfortunately, such a breakthrough is usually not achieved until
years after the time period prescribed by the statute of limitations has
expired, thus barring any chance of recovery."
Furthermore, even if a survivor can make the causal connection, Post-
Incest Syndrome typically will impair the survivor's ability to confront
the painful memories of the past abuse and work towards recovery.' A
survivor cannot recall the traumatic events without having to re-experi-
ence them with the same intensity as when they originally occurred.'
As a result, adult victims will "persistently avoid any situation, such as
initiating a lawsuit, that is likely to force them to recall and, therefore, to
re-experiepce the traumas.""
II. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
Traditionally, the legal response to childhood sexual abuse has been
limited to criminal prosecution.' However, the criminal justice system
has been ineffective in deterring childhood sexual abuse for several rea-
sons.' First, the majority of childhood sexual abuse victims rarely re-
port the crime to the proper authorities."7 As a result, criminal charges
49. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 210. A survivor of childhood sexual abuse experi-
encing Post-Incest Syndrome may subconsciously repress all memory of the traumatic
events and thus fail to identify the causal relationship between the unremembered
abuse and her existing physical and psychological problems. Camille W. Cook &
Pamela K Millsaps, Redressing Wrongs of the Blamelessly Ignorant Survivor of
Incest, 26U. RICH. L REV. 1, 5 (1991).
50. Lamm, supra note 31, at 2195.
51. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 210-11.
52. See Nabors, supra note 8, at 159 (describing how PTSD significantly limits a
survivor's ability to pursue a legal cause of action against her abuser).
53. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 210.
54. Id. See also DSM-Ill-R, supra note 48, at 248 (The person commonly makes
deliberate efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings about the traumatic event and about
activities or situations that arouse recollections of it.").
55. Lamm, supra note 31, at 2195.
56. See HFIMAN, supra note 1, at 163-68. In situations involving intra-family abuse,
fathers often persuade daughters to remain silent by describing the possible criminal
punishments he will suffer if the secret is revealed. Id. at 163. In these cases, the
criminal justice system actually serves to perpetuate rather than deter the problem of
childhood sexual abuse. Id.
57. BuTim, supra note 29, at 12-13. "It is estimated that anywhere from fifty to
1367
are not filed and criminal proceedings are never initiated against most
child abuse offenders.' Second, most criminal statutes of limitations for
child sexual abuse expire within five years after the crime's commis-
sion.' By the time most incidents of abuse are reported, the statutory
period has expired and the accused offender cannot be brought to jus-
tice.' Finally, sexual abuse is a difficult crime to prosecute,"1 and the
probability that the accused will be convicted is slight.' The criminal
justice system, therefore, is unable to provide adequate relief for victims
of childhood sexual abuse.'
ninety percent of all sexual assaults upon children remain unreported." Id. In Judith
Herman's study of 40 victims of childhood sexual abuse, only three (7.5%) filed
charges with the police. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 164. For further discussion regard-
ing why a child may refrain from reporting the abusive conduct and make no at-
tempt at breaking the silence, see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
58. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 164.
59. See Mithers, supra note 7, at 44. See generally, Jessica E. Mindlin, Child Sexu-
al Abuse and Criminal Statues of Limitation: A Model For Reform, 65 WASH. L
REV. 189 (1990) (discussing the statutes of limitation problem in criminal child sexual
abuse cases).
60. Mithers, supra note 7, at 44.
61. Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 22 (Nev. 1990). Justice Steffen of the Nevada
Supreme Court, commenting on the complexity of criminal prosecutions for child
sexual abuse remarked:
[T]he issue evokes a plethora of problems stemming from such factors as the
age of child-victims, lack of witnesses, frequent lack of physical evidence, vic-
tim defense mechanisms, prosecutorial inexperience, imprecise and controver-
sial investigative and therapy methodology, parental responses and involve-
ment, tension between an accused's right of confrontation and compounding
the extent and duration of trauma to the child-victim, hysteria, length and
adversarial nature of judicial proceedings, and fear.
Id.
62. See Mithers, supra note 7, at 44; see also HERMAN, supra note 1, at 164-65.
Herman argues that the low rate of conviction results because a defendant benefits
from greater legal protection than the child who accuses him. Id. at 164. She notes
that the defendant is given the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty, to
confront his accuser in a public trial, and to cross-examine any witness testifying
against him. Id. She argues that these Judicial safeguards put the defendant at an
enormous advantage where often the only witness for the prosecution is a child. Id.
at 164-65. In addition, most young victims simply do not possess the emotional
strength necessary to endure a lengthy criminal investigation and trial. Id, at 165.
Herman notes that the child victim must often endure bullying cross-examination by
the defense attorney and, in cases of intra-family abuse, tremendous pressure from
the defendant and other family members to recant or change their story. Id. at 165-
66. Herman points out, "In reality, false denials of incest are vastly more common
than false complaints." Id. at 166.
63. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 168. In regards to intra-family abuse, the author
comments:
The laws as written are rarely enforced and, when enforced, rarely benefit
the child. The threat of punishment does little to inhibit incestuous fathers,
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In response, during the 1980s, a number of adult survivors of child-
hood sexual abuse began to demand accountability from their abusers in
a different way." They filed personal injury lawsuits in hopes of receiv-
ing monetary compensation for the damages inflicted upon them during
childhood. '
Civil remedies provide multiple benefits for the adult survivor of child-
hood sexual abuse. In addition to punishing the offenders and deterring
future abuse, ' a civil damages award can provide the plaintiff with com-
pensation for lost wages and the costs of long-term psychotherapy.w
Plaintiffs will also benefit emotionally from the opportunity to break
their silence and publicly place the blame for the abuse on the appropri-
ate individual, the defendant ' Regardless of whether the survivor is
and the fact of punishment does nothing to rehabilitate them. In effect, the
justice system serves to uphold and protect the authority of the father, no
matter how abusive.
ICL
64. See Mithers, supra note 7, at 44.
65. Id. Courts have refused to recognize a separate tort for child sexual abuse. See
St. Michelle v. Robinson, 759 P.2d 467, 471 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (contending that a
separate cause of action for child abuse is unnecessary and that traditional tort doc-
trines are sufficient). Instead, plaintiffs in civil abuse suits must base their claims on
traditional tort theories such as battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Margaret J. Allen, Comment,
Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 609, 618-28 (1983).
66. Victims of childhood sexual abuse may recover punitive damages from their
abusers. See, e.g., Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) (awarding plaintiff
$30,000 in punitive damages). Punitive damages serve the dual purpose of punishing
the defendant as well as deterring him and others from committing similar acts in
the future. Zhadan v. Downtown LA. Motors, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140 (Ct. App. 1976)
("[T]he purpose of punitive damages [is] to punish the defendant and make an exam-
ple of [her/him]I."). In California, the jury can. award punitive damages upon a proper
showing by the plaintiff that the defendant's conduct was malicious. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3294 (West 1.982). Malice is defined by statute as "conduct which is intended by
.the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others." 1d,
§ 3294(c)(1).
67. See Mithers, supra note 7, at 58. An increase in the number of civil actions
filed by survivors of childhood sexual abuse also benefits all of society by increasing
public awareness of the problem and by breaking the silence surrounding sexual
abuse which only serves to perpetuate the problem. Lamm, supra note 31, at 2195.
68. Lamm, supra note 31, at 2195. However, despite the potential benefits a victim
may derive from pursuing a civil claim, survivors of childhood sexual abuse who
seek legal redress from the courts are certain to face a disturbing and traumatic
experience. Id at 2196. "They are forced to relate and thus re-experience the victim-
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successful, a civil suit provides the plaintiff an opportunity "to reveal
what for so long could not be said and to stand up to someone against
whom she was once so powerless."' Finally, by requiring child sexual
abusers to compensate their victims for the harm they have inflicted,
"society will be sending a loud and clear message that it will no longer
tolerate this behavior."" However, only a few plaintiffs who bring civil
actions have the opportunity to tell their sides of their stories. The ma-
jority of child abuse cases are summarily dismissed before any evidence
is presented because they typically are not filed within the time period
allotted by the statute of limitations.' Consequently, adult survivors of
childhood sexual abuse are denied their day in court and left without an
adequate legal remedy.'
IV. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DELAYED DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
Statutes of limitations are legislatively mandated time limits within
which civil actions must be brought." All jurisdictions have enacted
statutes of limitations setting the time period in which a plaintiff may file
a civil suit.' The actual length of a particular statutory time limit varies
with the given jurisdiction and the type of action involved.' The statuto-
ry time period begins to run against the plaintiff when the cause of ac-
tion accrues." Generally, a cause of action accrues on the date the
plaintiff could have first maintained a suit." In the typical personal iru-
ry tort case, the accrual date will coincide with the date of injury.
lzation they experienced as children, and to confront the hostile attitudes of the
defendant, his attorney, and perhaps even the judge or jury." Id.
69. Mlthers, supra note 7, at 58. Consider the following statement made by a
woman who recently filed a civil suit against her father for sexual abuse: "For me, a
victory would be more emotional than financial .... Whether I win or lose, rul have
taken my power back from him. I guess rl have stood up for the little girl inside."
Id.
70. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 219.
71. Mlthers, supra note 7, at 44.
72. Id.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 899 (1977).
74. Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L REv.
1177, 1179 (1950) [hereinafter Developments].
75. See id,
76. REFsrATEMENT, supra note 73, § 899 cmt c.
77. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 172 (N.H. 1977). "There are at least
four points at which a tort cause of action may accrue: (1) [wlhen the defendant
breaches his duty;, (2) when the plaintiff suffers harm; (3) when the plaintiff becomes
aware of his injury;, and (4) when the plaintiff discovers the causal relationship be-
tween his harm and the defendant's misconduct." Id.
78. ld; See also Developments, supra note 74, at 1200 (stating that where there is
a delay between any of the four events, the choice of accrual becomes more com-
plex).
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The statutes of limitations governing the types of claims typically as-
serted by adult survivors against their abusers range from one to three
years.' Although most jurisdictions toll the time period until the
plaintiff reaches the age of majority,' the psychological effects of the
abuse typically prevent the adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse
from overcoming barrier the statute of limitations poses."1
A. Policy Rationale Behind Statutes of Limitations
Traditionally, courts have stated three different policy reasons in sup-
port of strict application of statutes of limitations.' The first is a desire
to promote accurate fact finding by expediting cases to trial before any
evidence is lost, and while witnesses' memories are fresh and reliable.'
A second rationale for statutes of limitations is fairness to the defen-
dant." A time should come when a potential defendant should be able
to continue his life without the fear of defending against stale claims.'
Finally, statutes of limitations discourage plaintiffs from "sleeping on
their rights" and induce them to act with diligence.'
79. See, e.g., Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802, 804 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (two-year stat-
ute of limitations); DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370 (Ct. App. 1987) (one-
year statute of limitations); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 25 (Nev. 1990) (two-year
statute of limitations); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 625 (Oki. 1992) (two-year
statute of limitations); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227 (Wash. 1986) (three-year
statute of limitations).
80. Develapments, supra note 74, at 1229-30.
81. For a discussion of how the psychological effects of childhood sexual abuse
and "Post-Incest Syndrome" impair the survivor's ability to timely file a civil suit, see
supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
82. See Developments, supra note 74, at 1185.
83. See Uited States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (Statutes of limitation
"protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death
or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or
otherwise."); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944) ("Statutes of limitation . .. are designed to promote justice by prevent-
lng surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.").
84. Developments, supra note 74, at 1185.
85. Id. (after a period of time a potential defendant "ought to be secure in his
reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations");
Order of PR. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348 ("[Tlhe right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.").
86. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123 (1979) (declaring that the pur-
pose of the statute of limitations is to require the reasonably diligent presentation of
1371
Unfortunately, even though courts toll the statute of limitations until
the victim reaches the age of majority, most survivors of childhood sexu-
al abuse do not, or cannot, discover the injuries within one to three
years after reaching that age." Therefore, survivors of childhood sexual
abuse need judicial relief from the unfairness which results from a strict
application of the statute of limitations. An exception to the rule seems
appropriate in light of the fact that the traditional rationales which
prompt statutes of limitations are inapplicable to childhood sexual abuse
cases.
B. Policy Not Applicable in Civil Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases
The belief that statutes of limitations ensure that causes of action are
adjudicated while the evidence is fresh and reliable does not apply in
childhood sexual abuse cases.' In most jurisdictions, the statute of limi-
tations is tolled until the child victim reaches the age of majority, usually
eighteen." Since most childhood sexual abuse occurs when the child is
under the age of thirteen,' the evidence will already be old and memo-
ries will already have faded by the time the statute begins to run when
the child reaches the age of majority." Therefore, extending the time
period will have little impact on the reliability of the evidence, and the
policy interest in having fresh evidence is not served.'
Modem rules of evidence also undermine the evidentiary function of
statutes of limitations. The rules of evidence function primarily to ex-
clude evidence that is untrustworthy or poses a high risk of undue preju-
dice.' These rules alone provide the defendant with sufficient protec-
tort claims against the defendant).
87. The psychological and emotional disorders commonly labelled as "Post-Incest
Syndrome" typically frustrate the survivor's ability to recognize the nature and extent
of the injuries she has suffered and prevents her from bringing suit For a further
discussion of these effects, see supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
88. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 211-12.
89. See supra text accompanying note 80.
90. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 83.
91. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 211-12.
92. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court stated that a sexual abuse victim should not be
"sacrificed for a policy disfavoring stale claims or the disturbance of abusers who
have grown accustomed to living free of concern over an eventual day of reckoning."
Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 23 (Nev. 1990).
93. Denise M. DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The
Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L REv. 191, 218
(1985). For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude many out-of-court state-
ments when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted on the basis that such
evidence is potentially unreliable. FED. R. EviD. 801, 802. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence also authorize the trial court to exclude relevant evidence that it finds unduly
prejudicial on the grounds that it will do more harm than good to the truth-finding
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tion against the admission of stale and unreliable evidence at trial.'
Protecting the defendant's interest in repose, or safety from litigation,
is also an inadequate justification for strict application of the statute of
limitations in a childhood sexual abuse case.' Children who are sexual-
ly victimized will continue to suffer from the emotional and psychologi-
cal consequences of that abuse for the rest of their lives.' Providing the
perpetrator repose from fear of an impending lawsuit is unjust and il-
logical when his acts will have a lifelong, negative impact on the victim-
ized child.' Clearly, the deterrent value of civil suits is extremely impor-
tant given the scope of the child sexual abuse problem in our society.
The public's interest in providing the adult survivor with adequate com-
pensation far outweighs the defendant's right to repose.'
The third policy justification for statutes of limitations, discouraging
plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights, is also seriously flawed.' A sur-
vivor of childhood sexual abuse should not be penalized for a supposed
lack of diligence when the survivor's delay in initiating the civil suit is
actually a direct result of the abuse caused by the defendant." Current
law creates a system that achieves an absurd and inherently unjust re-
sult: the likelihood of prosecution decreases as the abuse gets more se-
vere and traumatic. °
Support for strict application of the statute of limitations is also based
upon the fear that the lack of such limitation may result in a substantial
increase in the filing of fraudulent claims." Although the risk of
process. FED. R. EVID. 403.
94. DeRose, supra note 93, at 219 (-The function and effect of the modem rules
of evidence supplant the evidentiary function of date-of-injury accrual.").
95. Nabors, supra note 8, at 161-62.
96. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
97. DeRose, supra note 93, at 217 (stating that there is no public benefit derived
from protecting child- sex offenders from the consequences of their actions, even
years after the acts were committed).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 212.
101. Id. Rosenfeld makes this additional point
Current law has an unconscionable effect in that it rewards abusers when
their actions cause the victim to be severely traumatized, thereby decreasing
the survivor's ability to sue, by providing a shield from liability. A rational
and well-thought-out social policy would create a system in which the likeli-
hood of prosecution increases as the abuse gets more severe and traumatic.
ld.
102. See Hagen, supra note 40, at 376.
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fraudulent claims is of genuine judicial concern, this threat is significant-
ly mitigated in the context of childhood sexual abuse." There is no evi-
dence to support the view that the number of meritless claims will in-
crease if the statute of limitations is tolled through application of an
exception to the general rule.10 First, many potential plaintiffs are al-
ready discouraged from filing suits due to the highly emotional and dis-
turbing issues involved." In addition, court rules and procedures have
already been implemented to protect defendants from fraudulent
claims. 06
Ultimately, society must decide whether to protect the justice system,
and the accused, from stale or meritless claims, or to ensure that victims
of childhood sexual abuse can seek redress for their injuries."° Statutes
of limitation serve no rational purpose in civil cases filed by adult survi-
vors of childhood sexual abuse. Their only effect is to deny this particu-
lar class of claimants the opportunity to hold their abusers accountable
and to recover the monetary compensation to which they are properly
entitled. Therefore, if a survivor of childhood sexual abuse is ever to be
afforded the opportunity to recover damages, an exception to the
harshness and inflexibility of statutes of limitation must be established.
C. The Delayed Discovery Rule
The courts have consistently refused to apply traditional equitable
theories such as estoppel,' fraud, and insanity"' to toll the statute
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Mithers, supm note 7, at 58. Many adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse
choose not to bring suit against their abusers even when an exception to the statute
of limitations is made available. Id. Eliana Gil, a therapist in California, estimates that
about 5096 of her patients decide not to sue because of the aggressive and ad-
versarial nature of the legal system. Id,
106. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, designed to sanction attorneys
who file frivolous claims, is one example of a rule that protects defendants from the
filing of fraudulent claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Rule 11 requires all filings in feder-
al court to be signed by an attorney attesting that the claim is being made after a
reasonable inquiry and In good faith. Id. Another deterrent against the filing of
groundless actions is the tort of malicious prosecution. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 120, at 889-896 (5th ed. 1984) [herein-
after PROSSER & KEETON].
107. Mlithers, supra note 7, at 62. Attorney Shari Karney asks whether it is more
important that "we save our judicial system from the possibility that there might be
some misuse of this ability to sue later, or that virtually everyone who's a victim of
sexual abuse will never even get a chance?" Id.
108. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting the plaintiffs
attempt to toll the statute of limitations on the basis of equitable estoppel); DeRose
v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 377 (Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument
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of limitations in claims filed by adult survivors of childhood sexual
abuse. As a result, in recent years adult survivors of childhood sexual
abuse have relied most often upon delayed discovery to bypass strict
application of the statute of limitations."' The delayed discovery rule
provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovers or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered her cause of action."' Grounded in principles of funda-
mental fairness,"' the rule was formulated to avoid the unjust result
that occurs when the statute of limitations period expires before the
plaintiff is made aware of any basis for a cause of action."4 The dis-
that claim was timely filed under the doctrine of equitable estoppel); Hoffman v.
Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608-09 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that the defendant was
not estopped from raising the statute of limitations as defense to plaintiffs action).
See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 2, for further discussion of the equitable estoppel
theory and civil childhood sexual abuse cases.
109. See, e.g., E.W. and D.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817, 821 (Mont. 1988) (statute of
limitations not tolled on grounds of fraudulent concealment where the plaintiff, upon
reaching majority, recognized the illegality of the act); Snyder v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 156, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1988) (same).
110. For examples of cases refusing to apply the insanity exception, see Smith v.
Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1987); DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 378
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608 (App. Div. 1990). Cf.
Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
insanity exception tolled the statute of limitations if the plaintiff could prove she re-
pressed memories of sexual abuse and if there was corroborating evidence for the
plaintiffs testimony that the abuse occurred).
111. See, e.g., Doe v.. Doe, 973 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1992); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand,
736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Hoult v. Hoult, 792 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1992);
Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1990); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552
So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Meiers-Post v. Shafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990); Osland v. Osland, 442
N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1992); Hammer v.
Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
112. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 899 cmt e. "A statute must be construed
as not intended to start to run until the plaintiff has in fact discovered the fact that
he has suffered injury or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered
it." Id.
113. See Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 231 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (Pearson, J., dis-
senting) (stating that "fundamental fairness ... has always been the linchpin of the
discovery rule").
114. Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W. 2d 23, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), see also
Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 20 (Nev. 1990). "The rationale behind the discovery
rule is that the policies served by statutes of limitation do not outweigh the equities
reflected in the proposition that plaintiffs should not be foreclosed from judicial
remedies before they know that they have been injured and can discover the cause
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covery rule recognizes that in cases involving latent harm, "the injustice
of barring meritorious claims before the claimant knows of the injury
outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent actions."115
The evolution of the discovery rule can be traced back to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Urie v. Thompson." In Urie, the
plaintiff contracted silicosis as a result of inhaling silica dust throughout
his thirty-year career as a railroad fireman."7 Although strict application
of the statute of limitations would have precluded the plaintiffs bringing
suit, the Court held that the plaintiffs action was not barred by the limi-
tations period."8 The Court concluded that because of the plaintiffs
"blameless ignorance" of his injury, his claim did not accrue until his
condition became manifest and was diagnosed."' While Urie involved a
latent occupational disease, courts have since extended application of
the discovery rule to medical malpractice,'n other areas of professional
malpractice, products liability,' and other tort cases."
of their injuries." Id,
115. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 335 N.W.2d
578, 582 (Wis. 1983)).
116. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
117. Id. at 165-66. The plaintiff was first exposed to the silica dust in 1910 and was
diagnosed with silicosis and forced to discontinue work in 1940. Id.
118. Id at 170-71. In 1941, the plaintiff filed a claim under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act (FELA) which has a three year statute of limitations period. Id. at 165,
167. Under a strict application of the three year statute of limitations, any claim filed
by the plaintiff after 1913 would have been time barred and subject to dismissal by
the court.
119. Id. at 170-71. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff's failure to have his condi-
tion diagnosed, even though no symptoms had appeared, did not constitute a waiver
of his rights to pursue a claim. Id. at 169. The Court felt the Legislature did not
intended to bar the claim of a blamelessly ignorant plaintiff. Id. at 170.
120. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 106, § 30 at 166 & n.18. See, e.g., Quinton v.
United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962) (incompatible blood transfusion);
Bussineau v. President and Director of Georgetown College, 518 A.2d 423 (D.C. 1986)
(medical malpractice claim); Grey v. Silver Bow County, 425 P.2d 819 (Mont. 1967)
(surgical infection); Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio
1983) (misdiagnosis); Neilsen v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 446 N.E.2d 209, (Ohio Ct
App. 1982) (doctor left surgical needle inside patient's body).
121. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 106, § 30 at 167 & nn.20-22; see, e.g., Moonie
v. Lynch, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Ct App. 1967) (accountant malpractice); Ehrenhaft v.
Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 1984) (architect malpractice); Willis v. Mav-
erick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988) (attorney malpractice).
122. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 106, § 30 at 167 & n.23; see, e.g., Yustick v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1558 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (oral contraceptive); Bennett v. Dow
Chem. Co., 713 P.2d 992 (Mont 1986) (manufacturer of herbicide chemicals); Hansen
v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. 1983) (intrauterine device).
123. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 106, § 30 at 167 & n.24; see, e.g., Cain v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 132 Cal. Rptr. 860 (Ct App. 1976) (invasion of privacy);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Uiman, 412 A.2d 1240 (Md. 1980) (libel).
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V. APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE TO CIVIL CHILDHOOD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES
The rationale behind the discovery rule is equally applicable to claims
filed by adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse.' Many of the inju-
ries that result from childhood sexual abuse do not manifest themselves
until the child reaches adulthood.' Children who suffer from Post-In-
cest Syndrome often experience debilitating psychological effects from
the abuse that inhibit their ability to recognize the full nature and extent
of the damage they have suffered.' Others may completely repress all
memory of the abuse, thus preventing discovery of a legal cause of ac-
tion.' As a result, many potential claimants remain "blamelessly igno-
rant" of their right to sue for years after the abuse has ended.
Courts have responded differently to adult survivors' attempts to toll
the statute of limitations through application of the discovery rule. Many
jurisdictions construe the statute literally and flatly reject application of
the discovery rule in childhood sexual abuse cases.' Other courts have
responded favorably to the notion that the discovery rule is appropriate
in civil sexual abuse cases, but they disagree as to how and when to
apply the doctrine.'
A. Courts that Reject Application of the Discovery Rule in Civil
Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases
Initially, courts rejected application of the discovery rule to childhood
sexual abuse cases and dismissed claims filed after the statute of limita-
tions expired.,2 5 An adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse first made
the discovery rule argument in Tyson v. Tyson.3 The survivor, at the
age of twenty-six, brought suit against her father, alleging that he sexual-
124. See Lamm, supra note 31, at 2198. In fat the author comments that survivors
of childhood sexual abuse have even more convincing arguments for the application
of the discovery rule to their cases than do other tort plaintiffs. Id,
125. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
128. See ifra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
129. See ifa notes 143-213 and accompanying tex
130. See, e.g., DeRose v. Carswel, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987); Tyson v.
Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
131. 727 P.2d at 227.
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ly abused her from the time she was three years old until she was elev-
en.' She claimed that she had repressed all memory of the prior abuse
until beginning psychotherapy at age twenty-five, thus resulting in her
delayed claim.'
The Washington Supreme Court rejected Tyson's argument and refused
to apply the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse claims in the ab-
sence of objective, verifiable evidence that the alleged abuse actually
occurred."N The court was primarily concerned with the serious eviden-
tiary problems associated with litigating claims based on events remem-
bered years after the limitations period had expired." The majority also
determined that the availability of expert testimony by treating psycholo-
gists or psychiatrists would not lessen the subjectivity of the plaintiffs
claim due to the imprecise nature of such disciplines." In reaching this
conclusion, the Tyson court relied primarily on a single law review arti-
cle"' that calls into question the subjective and unscientific nature of
both psychology and psychiatry."M Ultimately, the court refused to ap-
132. Id
133. Id. The Washington statute of limitations required that Tyson fie her claim
within three years after accrual of the action. The state's disability statute tolled the
statute of limitations until age eighteen. Because Tyson waited more than eight years
following her eighteenth birthday before filing her claim, the statute of limitations
barred her action. Id
134. Id. at 228. In deciding not to apply the discovery rule, the court distinguished
childhood sexual abuse cases from medical malpractice actions. The court reasoned:
In prior cases where we have applied the discovery rule, there was objective,
verifiable evidence of the original wrongful act and the resulting physical
injury. This increased the possibility that the fact finder would be able to de-
termine the truth despite the passage of time, and thus diminished .the danger
of stale 'claims.
Id.
135. Id, at 228-29. The court stated that "stale claims present major evidentiary
problems which can seriously undermine the courts' ability to determine the facts. By
precluding stale claims, statutes of limitation increase the likelihood that courts will
resolve factual issues fairly and accurately." Id. at 228.
136. The majority explained, "Unlike the biological sciences, their methods of inves-
tigation are primarily subjective and most of their findings are not based on physical-
ly observable evidence." Id. at 229. However, a dissenting justice vehemently argued,
"For the majority to imply that We should no longer welcome psychiatric testimony
in Washington courtrooms is to suggest that this court 'disinvent the wheel.'" Id. at
233 (Pearson, J., dissenting) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983)).
137. Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony,
60 WASH. L REV. 331 (1985).
138. Based upon the law review article, the majority in Tyson expressed the belief
that psychoanalysis can lead to a distortion of the truth in its effort to reconstruct
what really happened to the victim. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229. The court reasoned that
"[wlhile psychoanalysis is certainly of great assistance in treating an individual's
emotional problems, the trier of fact in legal proceedings cannot assume that -it will
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ply the discovery rule, concluding that the risk of prejudice to the defen-
dant outweighed the unfairness of dismissing Tyson's claim.' In 1988,
two years after the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Tyson, the
Washington state legislature enacted legislation to provide for the tolling
of the statute of limitations through the discovery rule in sexual abuse
cases.1
0
Several courts have relied upon the Tyson decision in reaching a sixni-
lar result.141 In fact, a considerable number of courts still refuse to ap-
ply the discovery rule, thereby denying adult survivors any chance to
bypass a strict application of the statute of limitations."'
B. Courts That Have Adopted the Discovery Rule in Childhood Sexual
Abuse Cases
Other courts, having recognized the unique type of harm suffered by
this class of plaintiffs, acknowledge the need for an exception to strict
application of the statute of limitations. These courts apply the discovery
rule in civil suits filed by adult survivors of child sexual abuse.' How-
produce an accurate account of events in the individual's past" Id
139. Id. at 229-30.
140. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340(1) (West 1992) (amending WASIL REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.16.340). See infra note 233 for the partial text of Washington's amended
statute.
141. Cases citing 7Json before the enactment of the Washington legislation include
DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374 (Ct. App. 1987); E.W. v. D.C.H, 754 P.2d
817, 820 (Mont. 1988); Kaiser v. Milliman, 747 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988);
Raymond v. Ingram, 737 P.2d 314, 317 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). Cases citing Tyson
after it was superseded by the Washington state legislature include Bally v. Lewis,
763 F. Supp. 802, 806 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512,
1520 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Mary D. v. John D., 264 CaL Rptr. 633, 637 (Ct. App. 1989);
Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Osland v.
Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 629
(Okla. 1992).
142. See Ser Abuse Suit Time-Barred Despite Plaintiffs Repression, LAWYERS ALEirr,
April 27, 1992, at 9 (reporting a counter-trend among courts to strictly enforce the
statute of limitations in sexual abuse claims); see, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 973 F.2d 237 (4th
Cir. 1992); Bally v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Lindabury v. Lindabury,
552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup.
Ct. 1991); Lovelace.v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1992); Bowser v. Guttendorf, 541
A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Doe v. R.D., 417 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 1992); Whatcott v.
Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Kaiser v. Milliman, 747 P.2d 1130
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
143. See Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 24 (Nev. 1990). In Petersen, the Nevada
Supreme Court stated.
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ever, the availability of the discovery rule does not guarantee its applica-
tion in any one particular case. The courts have not applied the rule uni-
formly, and there is a split of authority over the types of cases in which
application of the discovery rule is appropriate.'"
Courts are generally confronted by two types of cases when consider-
ing whether the discovery rule should apply to childhood sexual
abuse." Type one cases are those in which the plaintiff, at or before
the age of majority, knew she was sexually abused as a child but is un-
aware of the causal connection between the past sexual abuse and her
physical and emotional problems." Type two cases involve plaintiffs
who have completely repressed all memory or recollection of the sexual
abuse until shortly before filing the suit."' Courts have generally denied
recovery to plaintiffs in type one cases," with a few exceptions."
Conversely, courts deciding type two cases have consistently allowed
plaintiffs to recover."
1. Type One Cases: Plaintiffs Who Have Conscious Memory of the
Childhood Sexual Abuse
In type one cases, courts examine the victim's ability to understand the
wrongful nature of the sexual abuse and to discover the essential facts
Unlike almost all other complainants subjected to statutes of limitation, child
victims of sexual abuse suffer from a form of personal intrusion on their
mental and emotional makeup that interferes with normal emotional and per-
sonality development .... And, although physical trauma and injury present
in other torts may result in a gradual physical deterioration with concomitant
emotional distress, such actions usually are not complicated by the stigma,
fear and depression associated with [childhood sexual abuse].
Id. (footnotes omitted).
144. See infra notes 151-213 and accompanying text.
145. Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Type one cases in which courts have refused to apply the discovery rule
include Snyder v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1988);
DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987); E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817
(Mont. 1988); Raymond v. Ingram, 737 P.2d 314 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). For a discus-
sion of these cases, see irfra notes 151-76, and accompanying text.
149. Type one cases in which the courts have applied the discovery rule include
Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 623
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 177-86 and
accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. I1. 1988); Mary D. v.
John D. 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1989); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Dlv. 1990). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 187-213
and accompanying text.
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underlying her cause of action.5' Courts opposed to application of the
discovery rule in these cases reject the notion that a plaintiff must
achieve such discovery as would give complete knowledge of her legal
rights before the cause of action accrues."s Rather, these courts hold
that upon reaching the age of majority, the victim's awareness of psycho-
logical injuries associated with the prior sexual abuse is sufficient to
commence the running of the statute of limitations."'
A typical example of courts' responses to type one cases can be found
in the decision of the California Court of Appeal in DeRose v.
Carswell." In DeRose, the plaintiff charged that her stepgrandfather
had sexually abused her between the ages of four and eleven.' The
plaintiff did not maintain that she had forgotten the events, that she had
repressed any memory of the acts of abuse.' However, she claimed
that she was unable to realize the causal connection between the abuse
and her subsequent emotional injuries until after the statute of limita-
tions had expired."7
151. See E.W. v. D.C.H, 754 P.2d at 820-21 (denying recovery because the plaintiff
knew since childhood that she had been sexually abused).
152. Id. at 820; see infra note 176 and accompanying text.
153. See DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 373 (Ct. App. 1987); Raymond v.
Ingram, 737 P.2d 314, 317 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
154. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987).
155. Id. at 369. Under California law, the limitations period applicable to DeRose's
claim was one year, yet her cause of action did not accrue until she reached the age
of majority. Id. at 370 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 340(3), 340(a) (West 1992)).
Thus, the statute of limitations began to run in 1980, when she reached the age of
eighteen. DeRose filed her complaint in 1986, four years and ten months after the
statute of limitations had expired. Id, at 369-70.
156. Id. at 372. Both at trial and on appeal, DeRose maintained that she was aware
of the incidents that took place when she was a child. Id. She alleged in her com-
plaint-
[T]hat the assaults "were all committed against plaintiffs will and without her
consent" and that "[a]t the times of said sexual molestation, plaintiff felt
great fear and acceded to defendant's acts due to her perceptions of his
greater size and strength and his ability and intent to carry out his threats of
harm..
Id, at 371.
157. Id In her complaint, DeRose alleged that "Carswell's acts caused her to devel-
op 'psychological mechanisms' and 'psychological illnesses' which 'Prevented her from
knowing, recognizing and understanding the nature or extent of her injuries ... and
the causal relationship between her present injuries and defendant's past acts.'" Id. at
371-72. Defose maintained that she did not begin to make the connection between
her present injuries and the earlier misconduct until after she commenced psychologi-
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The California appellate court refused, as a matter of law, to apply the
discovery rule and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.'"
The court concluded that "[s]ince DeRose was aware of the alleged sex-
ual assaults, and since she suffered cognizable harm at the time,
California's delayed discovery rule does not apply." " However, the
court noted in dictum that had DeRose alleged that she had repressed
her memories of the sexual abuse, she might have been able to invoke
the discovery rule.'
The Washington Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Raymond
v. Ingram."' In Raymond, the plaintiff brought an action against her
paternal grandparents alleging that her grandfather sexually abused her
while her grandmother negligently allowed the abuse to occur." She
alleged that the abuse occurred from the time she was four until the time
she was seventeen, but she did not bring the cause of action until she
was already past the age of majority." The plaintiff admitted that, prior
to therapy, she had remembered some events of past sexual abuse by her
grandfather and recalled that as a child she had experienced mental an-
guish associated with the abuse.'" However, she claimed that she did
cal therapy. Id. at 372.
158. Id.; see also Marsha V. v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr. 473 (Ct. App. 1991). In Mar-
sha V., the plaintiff filed a cause of action against her stepfather, alleging that he
had sexually abused her from the time she was eight years old until she was seven-
teen years old. Id. at 474. Although the plaintiff was consciously aware of the prior
acts of abuse, she maintained that her discovery of "ongoing deep-seated psychologi-
cal injuries and the causal link between those injuries and [respondent's] misconduct
was delayedL" Id. at 476.
Relying on DeRose, the court held that the discovery rule was inapplicable, thus
barring the plaintiff's claim. Id, However, a dissenting justice remarked:
[I]t is neither wise nor fair to slam the courthouse door in the face of child
sex abuse victims who have been so traumatized by this experience that it
takes years for them to comprehend they have been irjured, or to awaken to
the wrongfulness of a parental figure's behavior with them, or to uncover the
true cause of their ongoing psychological misery.
Id, at 485 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
159. DeRose, 242 CaL. Rptr. at 373 (citations omitted). The court reasoned that the
discovery rule applies only when a plaintiff is unable to discover all of the facts
essential to her cause of action. Id, at 371. Because DeRose remembered the alleged
sexual assaults and suffered cognizable harm at the time, her cause of action began
to accrue when she reached the age of majority. Id. at 373.
160. Id. at 371. Furthermore, the court limited its inquiry to the allegations in
DeRose's complaint, and refused to decide whether a plaintiff who alleges recent rec-
ollection of prior acts of sexual abuse is entitled to apply the discovery rule. Id, at
371 nl1.
161. 737 P.2d 314 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
162. Id, at 315,
163. Id.
164. Id at 317. The plaintiff stated that as a child she would get a stomachache if
1382
[Vol. 2 1359, 19931 Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
not understand the extent and cause of her current emotional and psy-
chological injuries until she began therapy shortly before filing suit.s
The court rejected the plaintiffs discovery rule argument and held that
the statute of limitations barred the claim." The court reasoned, "It
does not matter that Raymond had not discovered the causal connection
to all her injuries, because when Raymond reached the age of majority
she knew that she had substantial damages associated with the sexual
abuse.""
The Supreme Court of Montana in E.W. v. D.C.H." also refused to
apply the discovery rule in a type one case where the plaintiff was aware
the sexual abuse had occurred." At the age of thirty-four, the plaintiff
filed a claim alleging that her step-uncle sexually abused her for a period
of seven years during her childhood.'O As a result, the plaintiff experi-
enced emotional and physical disorders as a young adult.' Although
she always knew she had been sexually abused,"7 she did not associate
she had to stay with her grandparents. dL at 315.
165. Id at 317. The plaintiff asserted that her cause of action did not accrue until
she began therapy and realized that her insomnia and stomach problems were the
result of the earlier sexual abuse. Id, at 316. The defendants responded that "though
Raymond ray not have known the causal connection of all of her injuries until
Raymond's therapy, Raymond knew that the sexual abuse had caused injury." Id. at
316-17.
166. Id. at 317.
167. Id. The plaintiff might have been successful in her argument had she alleged
that she repressed all memory of the sexual abuse. See Cook & Milisaps, supra note
49, at 36.
168. 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988).
169. Id. at 820;. see also Boswer v. Guttendorf, 541 A.2d 377 (Pa. 1988). In Bowser,
the plaintiff filed a cause of action against her former foster parents alleging that her
foster father sexually abused her while she resided in the foster parents' home. Id. at
378-79. The court declined to apply the discovery rule in the case because the plain-
tiff remembered.the prior acts of abuse and should have been aware of the salient
facts underlying her claim. Id. at 380. The court, in barring the claim, concluded that
the plaintiff "has not set forth allegations to demonstrate what facts rendered it
unreasonable to expect her to discover her inury when it occurred." Id,
170. Id at 817. The first instance of sexual fondling was alleged to have occurred
when the plaintiff was five years old. The plaintiff alleged that it continued on a
regular basis for four years. Id. at 818. At the age of nine, the defendant allegedly
forced the plaintiff to engage in sexual intercourse and the attacks continued for
three and a half years Id,
171. Id,.
172. Following her parents' discovery of the abuse, medical examinations confirmed
the sexual activity. Id. However, the examining physician was not consulted about
possible psychological effects of the abuse and the matter was never addressed. Id,
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her psychological and physical problems with the prior abuse.'" In
1986, after psychiatric counseling indicated a possible causal connection
between her continuing emotional problems and the childhood sexual as-
saults, the plaintiff filed her cause of action maintaining that the statute
of limitations was tolled pursuant to the discovery rule.74 The court dis-
agreed and refused to extend the discovery rule to sexual abuse cases
where the plaintiff "consistently acknowledged that she 'always knew'
she had been molested as a child and that she has suffered from psycho-
logical problems since late adolescence." The court concluded that
the plaintiff, upon reaching the age of majority in 1973, had more than
sufficient knowledge to bring a cause of action, and her failure to fully
understand her legal rights was not sufficient to toll the statute of limita-
tion.17
6
Although courts generally deny recovery to plaintiffs who allege they
had factual knowledge of the abuse during the statute of limitations peri-
od, a few courts have reached the opposite result and apply the discov-
ery rule to type one cases.'7 These courts acknowledge that the psy-
chological effects of the sexual abuse can render plaintiffs unable to fully
discover both the extent and the cause of their emotional ijuries.
Courts favoring the discovery rule in type one cases conclude that the
cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers both the fact
and cause of the ijury and can fully comprehend her legal rights."
For example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the discovery
173. Id.
174. Id. The plaintiff asserted that "the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to
the discovery rule because her injuries had not fully manifested, she was not aware
of her legal rights, and she was not aware of the causal relationship between her
injuries and the molestation until she received therapy in 1983." Id.
175. Id. at 820.
176. Id. The court reasoned:
The law does not contemplate such discovery as would give complete knowl-
edge before the cause of action accrues. Rather, the discovery doctrine only
tolls the running of the statutory clock until such time as the plaintiff, in the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have been aware of the
wrongful act and injury.
Id. (citations omitted).
177. See, e.g., Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Hammer v. Hammer,
418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 428 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 1988).
178. See, e.g., Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 26 n.7. "[E]ven though a daughter may know
that she has been injured, until such time as she is able to shift the blame for the
incestuous abuse to her father, it will be impossible for her to realize that his behav-
ior caused her psychological disorders." Id. (quoting Allen, supra note 65, at 630).
The court went on to state, "As with discovery of injury, discovery of cause can take
years." Id.
179. Id. at 26-27.
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doctrine to a type one case in Hammer v. Hammer." In Hammer, the
plaintiff alleged that she was sexually abused by her father, on the aver-
age of three times a week, beginning when she was five years old and
ending when she was fifteen." Ten years after the abuse ended, the
plaintiff filed suit against her father, however, she never maintained that
she had forgotten or repressed any memories of the sexual abuse she
experienced.' The plaintiff claimed that because of the psychological
trauma caused by the acts of sexual abuse and the various coping mech-
anisms she developed, she was unable to understand the extent and
cause of her injuries until she received psychological counseling as an
adult.'
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's summary
judgment ruling for the defendant and applied the discovery rule to the
case.' The court held that a cause of action will not accrue until the
plaintiff discovers both the fact and cause of the injury. More precise-
ly, the court stated that "a cause of action will not accrue until the plain-
tiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have dis-
covered, not only the fact of injury but also that the injury was probably
caused by the defendant's conduct.""' By incorporating both the discov-
ery of injury and the discovery of causation in its decision, the court, in
180. 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
181. Id. at 24. At the age of fifteen, the plaintiff reported the abuse to her mother.
However, her parents denied such conduct ever took place and trivialized the matter.
The plaintiffs father managed to convince her that she was not injured and that she
was to blame for her problems as well as the family's problems. Id. at 24-25.
182. Id. at 24.
183. 1d. at 25. The plaintiffs psychological counselor stated in his affidavit-
[Als a normal post-traumatic stress reaction, Laura had developed denial and
suppression coping mechanisms. Because she had failed to understand or
appreciate the abusive nature of her father's acts she had been unable to
discover their psychological damage. The danger of her father subjecting her
younger sister to the same type of abuse stimulated her awareness and de-
layed feelings about what had transpired years before.
Id.
184. Id, at 27.
185. Id. at 26. The court rejected the defendant's argument that because the plain-
tiff suffered harm at the time of the sexual abuse and was aware of such harm, her
cause of action accrued at the time of injury. Id. at 27.
186. Id. at 26 (quoting Borelo v. U.S. Oil Co., 388 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Wis. 1986)).
The court further stated, "[A] cause of action does not necessarily accrue when the
first manifestations of injury occur. The claimant has leeway to not start an action
until she knows more about the injury and its probable cause." Id. at 27.
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effect, determined that the discovery rule applies in both type one and
type two cases.
2. Type Two Cases: Plaintiffs Who Have Repressed Memories of the
Childhood Sexual Abuse
Courts have consistently favored application of the discovery rule in
type two cases. 7 In contrast with the type one plaintiff, the type two
plaintiff has no conscious memory of the past sexual abuse because of
the psychological defenses and coping mechanisms she has developed to
withstand the childhood sexual trauma" Recognition by the courts
that "repression" or "memory loss" is a bona fide and common psycho-
logical response among survivors of childhood sexual abuse has led to
greater support for application of the discovery rule to type two cas-
es."u Courts have been more sympathetic to the "blameless ignorance"
of type two plaintiffs who have experienced total memory loss, as op-
posed to type one plaintiffs who have actual knowledge of the abuse."
In Johnson v. Johnson," a federal district court in illinois became
the farst to explicitly define and acknowledge the distinction between
type one and type two cases." In Johnson, the plaintiff filed suit
against her father, alleging that he repeatedly sexually abused her be-
tween the ages of three and thirteen.' The plaintiff was unaware of
her possible claim for approximately twenty years until she began psy-
chotherapy at the age of thirty-two."' The plaintiff maintains that she
suppressed all memories of the abuse and remained blamelessly ignorant
of the causal connection between her father's acts and the iruries she
suffered." The court classified the case as type two and held that the
discovery rule applied."
Although the court did not expressly reject application of the discov-
187. See itura notes 191-213 for a discussion of the cases.
188. Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
189. Kristin E. Rodgers, Childhood Sexual Abuse: Perceptions on Tolling The Statute
of Limitations, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POL'Y 309, 326 (1992).
190. See Lamm, supra note 31, at 2202. ("[W]hile total repression of memory ren-
ders a civil incest plaintiff so 'blamelessly ignorant' that it would be unfair to time-
bar her suit, it is not similarly 'reasonable' for a plaintiff who was aware of the
abuse not. to have brought her action within the statutory period.")
191. 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. M. 1988).
192. Id. at 1367.
193. Id, at 1364.
194. Id. at 1366. At the time, the personal injury statute of limitations in Illinois
Was two years. Id. In addition, Illinois had a statutory disability tolling provision for
minors. Id. at 1366-67.
195. Id. at 1364.
196. Id. at 1370.
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ery rule to type one cases, the court limited its holding to the particular
facts of the case." Furthermore, the plaintiffs complete memory loss
appears to have been the controlling factor in the court's analysis.tm
The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of California-the same
court that decided DeRose v. Carswell'9 only two years earlier-applied
the delayed discovery rule to a type two case in Mary D. v. John D.1
The plaintiff was twenty-four years old when she brought an action
against her father for sexual abuse that occurred until she was five years
old."l She maintained that she repressed her memories of the abuse
and had no conscious memory of it until shortly before filing the ac-
tion.' Despite the plaintiffs failure to present any psychiatric testimo-
ny to prove her claim that she completely repressed all memories of the
abuse,2m the court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judg-
197. Id.
198. dL Three years later, the same federal district court reconsidered the case
following a new motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant. Johnson v.
Johnson, 766 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. m. 1991). The motion was filed in response to a
recent legislative amendment to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure regarding child-
hood sexual abuse. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992). See
itfra note 222 for the partial text of Ilnois' revised statute. In addition to expressly
adopting the discovery doctrine, the new piece of legislation incorporated a statute of
repose, which barred any claim filed more than twelve years after the date the
plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen. ILL ANN. STAT. cI. 110, para. 13-202.2 (Smith-
Hurd 1992) ("[Blut in no event may an action for personal injury based on childhood
sexual abuse be commenced more than 12 years after the date on which the person
abused attains the age of 18 years."). Because the plaintiff in Johnson had not filed
her claim until after her thirtieth birthday, the court held that her claim was barred
under the new statutory scheme. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. at 664. The court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment yet left its reasoning in the prior decision
undisturbed. Id at 664-65.
199. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (CL App. 1987); see supra notes 154-60 and accompanying
text
200. 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1989), rehg denied, 800 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1990).
201. Id, at 634.
202. Id. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged "that the very nature of the acts and
the secrecy and duress by which they were accomplished, coupled with the relation-
ship of dependency and trust between plaintiff and defendant, caused plaintiff to
develop various psychological mechanisms including but not limited to denial, repres-
sion, and disassociation from the experiences." Id.
203. Id. at 635. The court noted "were this case in a procedural posture which
required plaintiff to present evidence, opinions as to the existence or cause of specif-
ic psychological processes such as repression or disassociation would require compe-
tent expert opinion testimony." Id. at 640.
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ment for the defendant.' The court concluded:
[T]he doctrine of delayed discovery may be applied in a case where the plaintiff
can establish lack of memory of tortious acts due to psychological repression
which took place before plaintiff attained the age of majority, and which caused
plaintiff to forget the facts of the acts of abuse until a date subsequent to which
the complaint is timely fled.2
Since 1988, at least one other court has announced a decision applying
the discovery doctrine to a type two case involving a plaintiff with re-
pressed memory.'
The Supreme Court of Nevada also provided a type two plaintiff with
relief from a strict application of the statute of limitations, yet the court
did so without applying the discovery doctrine.' In Petersen v. Bruen,
the defendant sexually abused the plaintiff from 1975 to 1983 while they
both participated in a "Big Brother' program.' The plaintiff filed his
cause of action in 1988, claiming to have repressed all memory of the
abuse until beginning therapy in 1987.'
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of
204. Id.
205. Id. at 639.
206. See Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct App. 1990). In Evans, three
brothers filed suit in 1987 against their foster parents alleging that their foster father
had sexually abused them as children from 1966 to 1968. Id. at 606. The plaintiffs
claimed they had developed psychological blocking mechanisms which precluded them
from acknowledging their injuries and rendered them unable to understand the causal
connection between their injuries and the prior abuse until they began therapy. Id. at
607. The court concluded that the plaintiffs "must be able to show they remained
unaware of, and had no reason to suspect, the wrongfulness of the conduct until a
time less than three years before this action was filed." Id. at 611. The court granted
the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint because their allegations were not
sufficient to trigger the discovery rule. Id.
207. Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990). Although the Nevada state legisla-
ture passed a statute in 1991 codifying the use of the discovery rule in childhood
sexual abuse cases, the Petersen case is indicative of the reluctance among courts to
extend application of the discovery rule to assist all survivors of childhood sexual
abuse. For the relevant language of the Nevada statute, see infa note 228.
208. Id. at 19. In addition, the defendant "memorialized his depravity by taking
photographs of Petersen before, during and after sexual trysts with his victim." Id.
Prior to the civil suit, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault, attempted
sexual assault, lewdness with a minor under the age of fourteen, use of a minor in
producing pornography, and possession of child pornography. Id.
209. Id The trial court found that Petersen's claim was barred by a two-year stat-
ute of limitations. Id, Because Petersen's complaint was filed five years after the last
incident of abuse, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id,
Petersen appealed the decision, arguing that his action was timely since "he did not
discover the nexus between Bruen's behavior and his emotional distress" until he
underwent therapy. Id,
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Petersen's claim but declined to apply the discovery rule to the case.
210
The court reasoned that in cases where clear and convincing proof of
childhood sexual abuse exists, the discovery rule was not the proper
solution."' Rather, the court concluded that "no existing statutes of lim-
itations applies to bar the action of an adult survivor of [childhood sexu-
al abuse] when it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
plaintiff has in fact been sexually abused during minority by the named
defendant."12 While the Petersen decision was helpful to its particular
plaintiff, it is uncertain how helpful this approach will be to plaintiffs in
other cases.
2 1
210. Id at 25.
211. Id. at 23. The court adamantly rejected application of the discovery rule based
upon the following criticisms of the doctrine:
First .... the complex of emotions burdening victims may be exacerbated by
forcing them to prematurely confront their abusers in order to preserve their
prospects for redress. Second, a victim's suffering may be intensified by the
realization that his or her failure to timely muster the will or the courage to
seek relief from the abuser has left the latter forever immune from civil
accountability. Third, it is reasonable to assume that certain victims, when
informed of the discovery rule, will add to their inner turmoil by dissembling
in order to avoid the bar of the statute. Fourth, under the discovery rule, the
CSA victim will be subjected to the ultimate irony of having to demonstrate
his or her integrity in claiming the benefit of' the rule. The thrust of the
action will shift from the actions of the abuser and the injuries of the victim
to matters of proof concerning the victim's allegations regarding either the
actual date and circumstances of discovery or worse yet, the time when the
victim reasonably should have discovered that the abusers conduct was the
source of his or her emotional and mental distress.
Id,
212. Id. at 24-25. The court noted, "We recognize that injustice may result from our
ruling in instances where CSA has occurred but cannot be demonstrated by corrobo-
rative evidence that is clear and convincing." Id. at 25. However, the court went on
to state that "the potential for fraudulent claims is sufficiently great to warrant such
a ruling, at least until such time as the legislature may elect to provide a period of
limitations directly addressing this specific problem." Id.
213. Despite the court's accurate critique of the discovery rule and its valid concern
regarding the doctrine's effect on a plaintiffs emotional health, the court's holding
will only help those plaintiffs capable of proving their case at the pleading stage.
Undoubtedly, most deserving plaintiffs will be unable to meet this exacting burden,
and their claims will be prematurely dismissed. In fact, the court stated, "Because
CSA will most often occur under circumstances which are difficult to prove, we
would encourage the legislature to enact legislation designed to provide the maximum
opportunity for justice in these most difficult types of cases." Id. (footnote omitted).
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VI. ADOPTING A UNIFORM SOLUTION
This Comment advocates a discovery doctrine which could potentially
provide all deserving adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse with a
meaningful opportunity to file suit and recover damages from their abus-
ers. However, the current status of the law undermines this objective.
Case law governing the application of the discovery rule is inconsistent
and ambiguous. While some courts acknowledge the survivor's unique
situation and apply the discovery doctrine in civil sexual abuse cases,
other courts do not." Furthermore, the fact that the discovery rule is
available in certain jurisdictions does not necessarily guarantee its ap-
plication."5 Courts continue to categorize and draw distinctions be-
tween different types of plaintiffs. This ultimately prevents many deserv-
ing plaintiffs from filing a cause of action. Under current law, many
courts accept the notion that it may be persuasive for the victim who
represses all memory of sexual abuse not to have discovered the abuse
earlier. However, the same courts may not find it equally reasonable that
a plaintiff aware of the abuse as well as the resulting serious psychologi-
cal problems would not have discovered the connection between the
two."' Certainly, a more uniform approach for applying the discovery
rule to claims brought by all adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse is
desperately needed and long overdue.
A. Legislative Response
Given the frequency of childhood sexual abuse in this country" ' and
its devastating consequences, society has a vital interest in ensuring that
state legislatures fully comprehend the nature of the problem and re-
spond accordingly. In order to provide adult survivors of childhood sexu-
al abuse with a meaningful opportunity to bring suit, state legislatures
throughout the country must amend their statutes of limitation to require
application of the discovery rule in all childhood sexual abuse ac-
tions."8 Legislation expressly providing for a date of discovery excep-
214. See supra notes 130-213 and accompanying text
215. See id,
216. See supra notes 143-213 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
218. Although the discovery rule is an equitable doctrine applied within a court's
discretion, this Comment advocates application of the discovery rule through statutory
provision. See Cook & Milisaps, supra note 49, at 40 (noting that the discovery
doctrine can be put into place through case law or statutory provision). A statutory
approach would ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs and elimi-
nate the uncertainty and subjectivity associated with judge made decisions.
In fact, many courts have refused to extend application of the discovery rule to
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tion would provide both type one and type two adult survivors with an
essential and valuable remedy. Absent such legislation, the courts will
often deny adult survivors the possibility of recovering civil damages for
the injuries inflicted by childhood sexual abuse. To date, most states
have not enacted legislation codifying the use of the discovery rule in all
civil sexual abuse cases and provide only illusory remedies for the major-
ity of adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse.
1. A Survey of State Statutes Currently in Effect
Over the past few years, several states have passed legislation revising
the statute of limitations period in which adult survivors of childhood
sexual abuse can file civil claims. States such as Alaska, 1' Califor-
sexual abuse cases under the belief that such a determination must be made by the
state legislature. See, e.g., E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817, 821 (Mont. 1988) ("While this
Court is aware of the horrifying damage inflicted by child molesters, it is not for us
to rewrite the. statute of limitations to accommodate such claims through judicial fiat.
Such. a task is properly vested in the legislature."); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 25
(Nev. 1990) ("Because CSA will most often occur under circumstances which are
difficult to prove, we would encourage the legislature to enact legislation designed to
provide the maximum opportunity for justice in these most difficult types of cases.");
Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) ("Perhaps it is time for
the Legislature to address this important issue, as other states have done, by enacting
a special statute affording victims such particular procedural relief."); Doe v. RD.,
417 S.E.2d 541, 543 (S.C. 1992) ("While the result may be appealing, we are without
authority to amend our statute. An exception to the plain and unambiguous language
of our statute of limitations must come from our legislature.") (footnote omitted).
219. The relevant sections of Alaska's statue read:
(b) An action based on a claim of sexual abuse ... may be brought more
than three years after the plaintiff reaches the age of majority if it is brought
under the following circumstances:
(1) if the claim asserts that the defendant committed one act of sex-
ual abuse on the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall commence the action
within three years after the plaintiff discovered or through use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered that the act caused
the injury or condition;
(2) if the claim asserts that the defendant committed more than one
act of sexual abuse. on the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall commence
the action within three years after the plaintiff discovered or
through use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
effect of the injury or condition attributable to the series of acts;
a claim based on an assertion of more than one act of sexual
abuse is not limited to plaintiffs first discovery of the relationship
between any one of those acts and the injury or condition, but
may be based on plaintiff's discovery of the effect of the series of
1391
nia,220 Colorado,22 ' Illinois,22 Iowa, 23 Maine," ' Minnesota, 2 Mis-
acts.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140(b) (1992).
220. California's statute reads, in pertinent part
(a) In any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of child-
hood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be
within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or
within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring
after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever
occurs later ....
(d) Every plaintiff 26 years of age or older at the time the action is filed
shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (e).
(e) Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff
and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plain-
tiff ....
(g) A complaint filed pursuant to subdivision (d) may not name the defen-
dant or defendants until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit
filed pursuant to subdivision (e) and has found, in camera, based solely
on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious
cause for the filing of the action. At that time, the complaint may be
amended to name the defendant or defendants. The duty to give notice
to the defendant or defendants shall not attach until that time.
CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1992).
221. Colorado's statute states in pertinent part, "any civil action based on a sexual
assault or a sexual offense against a child shall be commenced within six years after
a disability has been removed for a person under disability . . . or within six years
after a cause of action accrues, whichever occurs later, and not thereafter.* COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103.7(1) (West 1992). Colorado law defines accrual as the
date when "both the injury and its cause are known or should have been known by
the exercise of reasonable diligence." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-108(1) (West
1992).
222. The Illinois statute reads:
(b) An action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual
abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the date the person abused
discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that
the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was
caused by the childhood sexual abuse, but in no event may an action
for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse be commenced
more than 12 years after the date on which the person abused attains
the age of 18 years.
(c) If the injury is caused by 2 or more acts of childhood sexual abuse that
are part of a continuing series of acts of childhood sexual abuse by the
same abuser, then the discovery period under subsection (b) shall be
computed from the date the person abused discovers or through the use
of reasonable diligence should discover (i) that the last act of childhood
sexual abuse in the continuing series occurred and (ii) that the injury
was caused by any act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing se-
ries.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
223. Iowa's statute reads:
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souri,"2 Montana,227 Nevada,22 South Dakota,"' Utah,23 Ver-
An action for damages for injury suffered as a result of sexual abuse which
occurred when the injured person was a child, but not discovered until after
the injured person is of the age of majority, shall be brought within four
years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and
the causal relationship between the injury and the sexual abuse.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West 1992).
224. Maine's statute provides: "Actions based upon sexual intercourse or a sexual
act ... with a person under the age of majority must be commenced within 12
years after the cause of action accrues, or within 6 years of the time the person
discovers or reasonably should have discovered the harm, whichever occurs later."
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West 1992).
225. Minnesota's statute reads, in pertinent part-
(2) (a) An action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual
abuse must be commenced within six years of the time the plain-
tiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by
the sexual abuse.
(b) The plaintiff need not establish which act in a continuous series
of sexual abuse acts by the defendant caused the injury.
(c) The knowledge of a parent or guardian may not be imputed to a
minor.
(d) This section does not affect the suspension of the statute of limi-
tations during a period of disability ....
(3) This section applies to an action for damages commenced against a per-
son who caused the plaintiffs personal injury either by (1) committing
sexual abuse against the plaintiff, or (2) negligently permitting sexual
abuse against the plaintiff to occur.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West 1993).
226. Missouri's childhood sexual abuse statute reads, in pertinent part
2. In any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of child-
hood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be
within five years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of eighteen or
within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by child
sexual abuse, whichever later occurs.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (Vernon 1992).
227. The pertinent sections of Montana's statute read:
(1) An action based on intentional conduct brought by a person for recov-
ery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse
must be commenced not later than:
(a) 3 years after the act of childhood sexual abuse that is alleged to
have caused the injury; or
(b) 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have dis-
covered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual
abuse.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1991).
228. Nevada's statute reads, in pertinent part-
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mont,nl Virginia,' and Washington' have adopted laws expressly
(1) An action to recover damages for an injury to a person arising from the
sexual abuse of the plaintiff which occurred when the plaintiff was less
than 18 years of age must be commenced within three years after the
plaintiff:
(a) Reaches 18 years of age; or
(b) Discovers or reasonably should have discovered that his injury was
caused by the sexual abuse, whichever occurs later.
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11.215 (Michie 1991).
229. South Dakota's statute reads:
Any civil action based on intentional conduct brought by any person for
recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse
shall be commenced within three years of the act alleged to have caused the
injury or condition, or three years of the time the victim discovered or rea-
sonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by
the act, whichever period expires later.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-25 (1992).
230. Utah's statute provides:
(2) A person shall file a civil action for intentional or negligent sexual
abuse suffered as a child:
(a) within four years after the person attains the age of 18 years; or
(b) if a person discovers sexual abuse only after attaining the age of
18 years, that person may bring a civil action for such sexual
abuse within four years after discovery of the sexual abuse,
whichever period expires later.
(3) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual
abuse incidents caused the injury complained of ....
(4) The knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian shall not be imputed
to a person under the age of 18 years.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1992).
231. Vermont's statute provides:
(a) A civil action brought by any person for recovery of damages for injury
suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced with-
in six years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or
six years of the time the victim discovered that the injury or condition
was caused by that act, whichever period expires later. The victim need
not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse or exploi-
tation incidents caused the injury.
(b) If a complaint is filed alleging an act of childhood sexual abuse which
occurred more than six years prior to the date the action is com-
menced, the complaint shall immediately be sealed by the clerk of the
court. The complaint shall remain sealed until the answer is served or,
if the defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Ver-
mont Rules of Civil Procedure, until the court rules on that motion. If
the complaint is dismissed, the complaint and any related papers or
pleadings shall remain sealed. Any hearing held in connection with the
motion to dismiss shall be in camera.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (1991). A related statute provides:
When a person entitled to bring an action for damages as a result of child-
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allowing use of the discovery rule in civil actions filed by adult survivors
of childhood sexual abuse. Most of the states toll the statutes of limita-
tions until the adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse discovers, or rea-
sonably should discover, the elements of her cause of action. In contrast,
other states such as Connecticut' do not endorse the discovery rule
hood sexual abuse is unable to commence the action as a direct result of
the damages caused by the sexual abuse, the period during which the person
is incapacitated shall not be taken as a part of the time limited for com-
mencement of the action.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 560 (Supp. 1992).
232. Virginia's statute reads in pertinent part-
The cause of action in the actions herein listed shall be deemed to accrue as
follows: . . .
(6) In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery,
resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incompeten-
cy of the person, when the fact of the injury and its causal connection
to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed
physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist. However, no such action
may be brought more than ten years after the later of (i) the last act
by the same perpetrator which was part of a common scheme or plan
of abuse or (ii) removal of the disability of infancy or incompeten-
cy ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (Michie 1992).
233. Washington's statute reads:
(1) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by
any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of
childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within the later of the fol-
lowing periods:
(a) Within three years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or
condition;
(b) Within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably
should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by
said act; or
(c) Within three years of the time the victim discovered that the act
caused the injury for which the claim is brought-
Provided, that the time limit for commencement of an action under
this section is tolled for a child until the child reaches the age of
eighteen years.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1992).
234. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577d (West 1992). Connecticut's childhood sexual
abuse statute provides, "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to
recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused
by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such per-
son later than seventeen years from the date such person attains the age of majori-
ty." IL
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but simply extend the statutory period in which a civil childhood sexual
abuse claim can be fied.
a. Tolling vs. Extending the Statute of Limitations
Legislation tolling the statute of limitations until a plaintiff discovers or
reasonably should discover her cause of action is preferable to statutes
that merely extend the statute of limitations for a fixed number of
years.' Arguably, a statute that extends the limitations period may pro-
vide plaintiffs with greater protection than a statute that tolls the limita-
tions period until discovery. However, such statutes will have to pro-
vide a substantially longer time period than they currently offer if they
are to allow victims a sufficient opportunity to file a claim. 7 Further-
more, this approach "ignores the reality that each survivor's revelation of
childhood sexual abuse or recognition of the injury is unique, from both
an emotional and temporal standpoint, and is therefore inherently irrec-
oncilable with a rigid timetable mandated by statute."'m Because of the
unique psychological defense mechanisms which inhibit the victims' abili-
ties to understand the connection between their injuries and the abuse,
sexual abuse victims need the added versatility provided by statutes in-
corporating the discovery rule.
Although the discovery rule approach is preferable, statutes that blend
the two approaches provide plaintiffs with the best plausible protection
against a statute of limitations defense. For example, the California state
legislature extended the limitations period to eight years from the date
the victim reaches the age of majority.' Thus, the adult survivor of
235. See Carol W. Napier, Note, Civil Incest Suits: Getting Beyond the Statute of Limita-
tions, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 995, 1019-20 (1990) (noting that a statute adopting the discov-
ery rule rather than a fixed-time limitation provides greater protection for both the
plaintiff's and the defendant's interests).
236. Id. at 1019. Under a fixed-time limitations statute, any claim filed within the
statutory period will be deemed to be timely. In contrast, under the discovery rule
approach, there is no guarantee that the plaintiffs claim will survive a statute of
limitations defense. The plaintiff must still demonstrate that she acted with reasonable
diligence in discovering the elements of her cause of action. Id.
237. Id. For example, an eight year statute of limitations would not have helped the
plaintiff in Tyson any more than the existing three-year statue of limitations. Tyson v.
Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227 (Wash. 1986) (holding that claim filed by plaintiff eight
years after her eighteenth' birthday was barred by the statute of limitations). In
addition, a 12-year statute of limitations did not help the plaintiff in Johnson. John-
son v. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. 662, 664 (N.D. 111. 1991) (holding that claim filed by
plaintiff 18 years after reaching the age of majority was barred by 12-year statutory
repose period incorporated into childhood sexual abuse statute).
238. Rebecca L. Thomas, Note, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and
Statutes of Limitations: A Call for Legislative Action, 26 WAKE FOREST L RE V. 1245,
1284 (1991).
239. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West 1992) ("In any civil action for recovery
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childhood sexual abuse has until the age of twenty-six to timely file a
cause of action.' Beyond the age of twenty-six, a claim may be filed
up to three years from the time the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that any psychological injury or illness was
caused by the sexual abuse." By combining both an extended statute
of limitations period and a date of discovery tolling provision,
California's statutory scheme provides the adult survivor of childhood
sexual abuse with an adequate opportunity to timely file a cause of ac-
tion.'
b. Statutes of repose
In response to pressure from individuals and lobbyist groups who are
opposed to the discovery rule, some state legislatures have included stat-
utes of repose as part of their statutory scheme.' Statues of repose
place an outer time limit or cap on a plaintiff's ability to commence a
civil action regardless of any tolling provisions that may apply.2" How-
ever, these statutes of repose run counter to the specific objectives
served by the discovery rule in civil childhood sexual abuse cases.'
"[A] statute of repose may still rn before a cause of action is fully dis-
of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commence-
ment of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age
of majority.").
240. Id.
241. Id. ("[T]he time for commencement of the action shall be . . . within three
years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that
psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the
sexual abuse.").
242. In a jurisdiction with a limitations period extending eight years beyond the age
of majority, a survivor who discovers her possible cause of action before reaching
age 26 would be allowed a generous time period to cope with her realization and
begin the healin$ process prior to filing her claim. Furthermore, those plaintiffs who
do not discover their causes of action until after age 26 will also be accommodated
under this approach through the discovery rule clause.
243. See, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (12-year
statute of repose); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (Michie 1992) (10-year statute of re-
pose).
244. PRossER & KEETON, supm note 106, at 167-68 ("A statute of repose generally
begins to run at an earlier date and runs for a longer period of time than the oth-
erwise applicable statute of limitations unaffected by the discovery accrual rule.").
245. Id ("Such statutes . . . generally supplement or override the discovery accrual
rule. ... Statutes of repose by their nature reimpose on some plaintiffs the hard-
ship of having a claim extinguished before it is discovered.").
1397
covered because a statute of repose, like a limitation period, usually be-
gins to run at the date when all elements of the cause of action have ac-
crued."' As mentioned in the previous section, sexual abuse victims
need the versatility and flexibility that only a tolling provision such as
the discovery rule can provide.ul Therefore, state legislatures must not
insert a repose statute in any new child sexual abuse legislation if they
sincerely intend to provide adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse
with an adequate opportunity to pursue a civil remedy.
c. Eliminating the type one and type two distinction
States should also adopt a formulation of the discovery rule which will
accommodate all survivors of childhood sexual abuse and overrule the
courts' inequitable treatment of type one versus type two plaintiffs.'
Therefore, legislation should be enacted that eliminates the judiciary's
emphasis on whether the victim repressed or remembers the abuse.'
The limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff discovers all the
elements of her cause of action, including the sexually abusive acts, the
physical and emotional injuries suffered, and the causal connection be-
tween the two.sa
Maine's childhood sexual abuse statute is an excellent example of the
246. See also Cook & Milisaps, supra note 49, at 15-16 ("Thus if a state has a
statute of repose that could act to bar an. incest survivor's action after a specified
time period, the application of the discovery doctrine may still not permit the plain-
tiff to pursue her claims.") (footnotes omitted).
247. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (defining type one and type two
cases); see also Hagen, supra note 40, at 379 ("In all significant aspects, both cat-
egories of plaintiffs are alike. Once a court accepts the Type 1 plaintiffs argument
that the coping mechanism of repression results in not being able to identify the
current injury and its cause, It is inconsistent to reject the Type 2 plaintiffs argu-
ment").
249. Napier, supra note 235, at 1017. Legislation is necessary for the following
reason:
[clourts tend not to understand that virtually every victim engages in some
defense mechanism to protect herself from the horror of the abuse. These
defense mechanisms may cause the victim to repress memories of the
abuse, keep her from understanding that she has been harmed, or prevent
her from understanding the cause of her harm. The rights of the victim are
the same, however, regardless of the type of defense mechanism she
adopts.
Id.
250. Id. at 1018. This provision will allow the entire class of adult survivors the op-
portunity to file a cause of action by applying the discovery rule to toll the statutory
period for both type one and type two plaintiffs. See id, at 1017-18; see also Hammer
v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. CL App. 1987) (holding that a cause of action will
not accrue until the plaintiff discovers both the fact and cause of the inrury).
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disparate treatment of type one and type two plaintiffs under many stat-
utes. The Maine law tolls the statute of limitations until "the person dis-
covers or reasonably should have discovered the harm."" Because type
one plaintiffs claim they knew of the harm when the abuse occurred and
also knew that they suffered continuing emotional problems, the type
one plaintiffs claim will accrue at the time the abuse occurs.' In con-
trast, the claim held by a type two plaintiff, who suppresses all memory
of the abuse, will not accrue until the plaintiff recalls the sexually abu-
sive acts. As a result, this particular formulation of the discovery rule
will result in the inequitable treatment of type one and type two plain-
tiffs. Because this type of legislative formulation will not protect both
type one and type two plaintiffs, it should not be adopted or maintained
by state legislatures.
Most of the states that have recently passed legislation on this matter
have adopted causation-based discovery rules which toll the statute of
limitations until a victim of sexual abuse discovers all the elements of
her cause of action.m For example, Iowa tolls the running of the stat-
ute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers "both the injury and the
causal relationship between the injury and the sexual abuse."' s In Colo-
rado, the statute of limitations does not commence until "both the injury
251. See supra note 224 for the relevant portions of the statute. The statute con-
tains no reference to recognition of the causal connection betWeen the act and the
injury.
252. This will occur despite the type one plaintiff's inability to recognize the causal
connection between any psychological or physical injuries and the sexual abuse.
253. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (1992) ("that the act caused the injury or
condition"); CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West 1992) ("that psychological injury
or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse");
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-108 (1991) ("both the injury and. its cause"); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 735, para. 13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992) ("that the act of childhood sexual abuse oc-
curred and that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse"); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 614.8A (West 1992) (requiring discovery of "both the injury and the causal
relationship between the injury and the sexual abuse."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073
(West 1993) ("that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse"); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.046 (Vernon 1992) ("that the injury or illness was caused by child sexual
abuse"); MoNrT. CODE. ANN. § 27-2-216 (1991) ("that the injury was caused by the act
of childhood sexual abuse"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.215 (Michie 1991) ("that his
inury was caused by the sexual abuse"); S.D. CODIFED LAws ANN. § 26-10-25 (1992)
("that the injury or condition was caused by the act"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 522
(1991) ("that the injury or condition was caused by the act"); WASL. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.340 (West 1992) ("that the injury or condition was caused by said act").
254. IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West 1992); see supra note 223 for the relevant text
of Iowa's childhood sexual abuse statute.
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and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of
reasonable diligence. " ' These legislative enactments provide an oppor-
tunity for the entire class of childhood sexual abuse survivors to bring
suit because the discovery exception is applied to both type one and
type two plaintiffs.
d. Pre-trial screening procedure
A few states have also incorporated a pre-trial judicial screening proce-
dure into their civil childhood sexual abuse legislation.' Among the
new legislation, a recently amended California statute"? takes the most
comprehensive approach in addressing the rights of both the plaintiff and
the defendant. California's new law adopts an initial judicial screening
procedure designed to prevent spurious claims from flooding the court
system and damaging a defendant's reputation.' The law requires every
plaintiff twenty-six years of age or older to have his or. her attorney con-
suit with a licensed mental health professional and file "certificates of
merit" with the court attesting to both a legal and psychological basis for
the claim.' Furthermore, the plaintiffs complaint cannot disclose the
name of the defendant until the court reviews the "certificates of merit"
255. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-108 (1991); see supra note 221 for the partial text of
Colorado's statute.
256. See, e.g., CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1(e)-(g) (West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 § 522(b) (1991). Additionally, Virginia's statutory requirement of discovery by a li-
censed health care professional can be viewed as an informal, pre-trial screening
procedure since a qualified third party must first acknowledge the validity of the
claim. See Thomas, supra note 238, at 1285 n.300 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(6)
(1991). For the partial text of Virginia's statue of limitations, see supra note 232.
257. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1992); see supra note 220 for the partial
text of California's childhood sexual abuse statute.
258. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(e)-(g) (West 1992).
259. California's law provides as follows:
(e) Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff
and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff
declaring . . .
(1) That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the
attorney has consulted with at least one licensed mental health
practitioner... and that the attorney has concluded on the basis
of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meri-
torious cause for the filing of the action.
(2) That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to prac-
tice ... has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the.
relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has
concluded .. . that in his or her professional opinion there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to
childhood sexual abuse.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(e) (West 1992).
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and determines that there is "reasonable and meritorious cause for the
filing of the action."' Thus, the plaintiff's ability to invoke the three-
year statute of limitations after discovery hinges on the decision of a sin-
gle judge after evaluation of the affidavits."
In similar fashion, the state of Vermont has also adopted legislation in-
tended to protect the rights of both the plaintiff and the defendant.'
The Vermont statute sets the limitations period at six years from the date
of the act, or six years from the date the victim discovers that the injury
or condition was caused by the act.' Furthermore, if the complaint is
filed alleging an act of childhood sexual abuse that occurred more than
six years prior to the filing of the action, the complaint is immediately
sealed by the clerk and remains sealed until an answer is served, or the
court has ruled on a motion to dismiss, if any.' Any hearing held in con-
nection with the motion to dismiss shall be conducted in camera.s
State legislatures, for several good reasons, should not incorporate into
their own statutes the added procedural safeguards adopted in California
and Vermont. First, there is simply no reason to believe that such a stat-
utory mechanism designed to prevent an onslaught of meritless claims
from congesting the court docket and damaging the defendant's reputa-
tion is necessary.' As discussed earlier, the risk of an increase in the
filing of fraudulent claims brought about by the discovery rule is signifi-
cantly mitigated in this context. 7 Second, these unconventional judicial
260. See CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.1(g) (West 1992). The ielevant language states:
A complaint filed pursuant to subdivision (d) may not name the defendant or
defendants until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursu-
ant to subdivision (e) and has found, in camera, based solely on those certif-
icates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing
of the action. At that time, the complaint may be amended to name the de-
fendant or defendants.
Id.
261. Norrie Clevenger, Note, Statute of Limitations: Childhood Victims of Sexual
Abuse Bringing Civil Actions Against Their Perpetrators After Attaining the Age of
Majority, 30 J. FAM. L 447, 468 (1991-92).
262. VT. STAT. ANN. it. 12, § 522(2) (1991); see supra note 231 for the partial text
of Vermont's childhood sexual abuse statute.
263. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522(a) (1991).
264. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522(b) (1991).
265. Id
266. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
number of fraudulent claims filed will not increase as a result of tolling the statute
of limitations through application of the discovery rule.
267. See id
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procedures are undoubtedly detrimental to the interests and rights of
adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. In California and Vermont,
adult survivors of sexual abuse hoping to recover for their injuries are
unfairly singled out from countless other plaintiffs as being less
trustworthy and more inclined to fabricate the stories they are telling.'
Furthermore, in California, survivors of sexual abuse over the age of
twenty-six are unnecessarily and unfairly burdened by a law that requires
them to file additional affidavits and documents with the court, attesting
to the validity of their claims.' Such a requirement significantly in-
creases the cost of filing suit, thus imposing an unfair financial burden
on this particular class of plaintiffs. States adopting such procedures fall
into the popular trap of becoming overly concerned with protecting the
rights of the abuser at the expense of the party who needs protecting
more, the victim.
2. A Proposed Legislative Response
Within the past several years, the legal system has begun to acknowl-
edge the injustice surrounding strict application of the statute of limita-
tions in civil childhood sexual abuse cases. Several state legislatures have
passed laws tolling the statute of limitations until survivors of childhood
sexual abuse discover the causal relationship between their injuries and
the abusive acts. Legislatures in the remaining states must now act quick-
ly and decisively to enact legislation requiring their courts to apply the
discovery rule in childhood sexual abuse cases. The following constitutes
a proposed legislative response for states to consider in drafting future
legislation:
(1) In any civil action brought by any person for recovery of damages suffered
as a result of an injury or condition caused by childhood sexual abuse, the
action shall be commenced within eight years of the date the plaintiff at-
268. Plaintiffs frequently assert the discovery doctrine in medical malpractice, pro-
fessional malpractice, and products liability cases without the need for courts to seal
transcripts or conduct hearings in camera. See supra notes 120-22. Furthermore,
defendants in childhood sexual abuse cases are not more deserving, or in greater
need, of any special. protections than are defendants in other discovery rule cases.
The reputations of doctors, attorneys, and even large product manufacturers who
must defend against claims filed beyond the expiration of the ordinary statute of
limitations period are equally exposed to the risk of being damaged or destroyed by
meritless claims. The "blameless ignorance' rationale behind the discovery doctrine is
as applicable, without exception or qualification, to childhood sexual abuse cases as
It is to medical or professional malpractice cases.
269. Survivors of sexual abuse should not be subjected to any greater filing require-
ments or restrictions than plaintiffs asserting the discovery rule in other contexts of
the law. The adoption of such pre-trial screening procedures appears to be less a
product of rational public policy of society's inclination to disbelieve women who file
delayed charges than a product of childhood sexual abuse.
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tains the age of majority,' or within six"m years of the date the plaintiff
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the injury or con-
diton and the causal relationship between the injury or condition and the
sexual abuse,' whichever occurs later.
(2) As used in this section, the following terms are defined as:
(a) "Childhood sexual abuse," any act committed by the defendant against
the plaintiff which act occurred while the plaintiff was under the age
of eighteen years and which act would have been a violation of sec-
tion.... m
(b) "Injury or condition," either a physical injury or condition or a psycho-
logical injury or condition. A psychological ijury or condition need
not be accompanied by a physical injury or condition.'
(3) If the defendant committed more than one act of childhood sexual abuse
against the plaintiff, the plaintiff will not be required to prove which spe-
cific act caused the injury or condition.'
(4) This section does not affect the suspension of the statute of limitations
during a period of disability as otherwise proscribed by the laws of this
State.'
(5) The knowledge of a parent or guardian shall not be imputed to a minor.'"
(6) For purposes of this section, acts prohibited by statute between a minor
and a member or members of the opposite sex also apply to acts between a
minor and a member or members of the same sex."
270. See, e.g., CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a) (West 1992) t8 years); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 752-C (West 1992) (12 years).
271. States hae adopted various time periods. See, e.g., CAL Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 340.1(a) (West 1992) (three years from date of discovery); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-80-103.7(1) (West 1992) (six years from date of discovery); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 614.8A (West 1992) (four years from date of discovery); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.073(a) (West 1993) (six years from date of discovery); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
12-25.1 (1992) (four years from date of discovery); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 522 (1991)
(six years from date of discovery).
272. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West 1992).
.273. Each state should include its own statutory definition of childhood sexual
abuse. Establishing a uniform definition of childhood sexual abuse is beyond the
scope of this Comment
274. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046.1(2) (Vernon 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
12-25.1(1)(c) (1992). This provision is included to emphasize the significance of psy-
chological and emotional injuries in addition to those that are physical in nature.
275. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073(2)(b) (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
2-216(2) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-12-25.1 (1992); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.340(2) (West 1992).
276. See MIN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073(2)(d) (West 1993).
277. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073(2)(c) (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
12-25.1 (1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340(3) (West 1992).
278. See Thomas, supra note 238, at 1293 (included in the author's proposed statute
under section 2).
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This proposed statute attempts to define childhood sexual abuse and
to include psychological and emotional illnesses within its definition of
injury. In order to provide survivors of sexual abuse with the protection
they deserve, the statute allows an action to be brought anytime within
eight years after reaching majority. The statute also incorporates addi-
tional flexibility by adding a discovery based tolling provision available to
plaintiffs beyond the age of twenty-six. In addition, this proposal seeks to
afford the entire class of sexual abuse victims, including both type one
and type two plaintiffs, an equal opportunity to reach the merits of their
cases. This is accomplished through specific language that tolls the limi-
tations period until the plaintiff discovers both the injury and its causal
connection to the past sexual abuse. The responsibility for determining
the reasonableness of the plaintiff's discovery is left to the trier of
fact.' The proposed statute does not follow California's lead in estab-
lishing a pre-trial judicial screening procedure. Such a procedure is not
only unnecessary, but it adds a significant procedural obstacle impeding
the protection of the interests and legal rights of adult survivors of child-
hood sexual abuse.
VII. CONCLUSION
Childhood sexual abuse and its damaging effects are a disturbing fact
of life for an alarming number of people in our society. Victims suffer
serious psychological and physical problems that often persist over the
course of their lifetimes. Furthermore, the nature of this wrong often
generates a range of complex psychological injuries inherently likely to
preclude a victim of sexual abuse from realizing that she has been in-
jured or from knowing what caused her injuries. Often, by the time the
adult survivor realizes that her legal rights have been violated, the statute
of limitations has already extinguished any viable legal action.
While the legal system cannot undo the egregious harm inflicted on the
innocent child victims of sexual abuse, it can provide them with a rea-
sonable opportunity to seek compensation from the perpetrators of the
abuse. Permitting the actions of adult survivors of childhood sexual
abuse to reach the trier of fact will benefit not only individual plaintiffs
but society as a whole by providing an additional deterrent to this con-
duct. Certainly, "[i]f sexual abuse of young children is a pattern of behav-
ior that we as a society abhor and want to eliminate, there is no justifica-
tion for maintaining a system of law that prevents survivors from holding
their abusers accountable."'
279. See generay ILamm, supra note 31, for an extended discussion of the rea-
sonableness standard as applied to childhood sexual abuse cases.
280. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 219.
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The delayed discovery rule that this Comment advocates will provide
the adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse with the opportunity to
circumvent the statute of limitations and file a cause of action. However,
judicial application of the discovery rule has been inconsistent and has
achieved inequitable results. Courts have become immersed in legal tech-
nicalities to the point of losing touch with the essential issues of fairness
and justice. Until a uniform legislative approach to the discovery rule is
established, adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse simply will not be
guaranteed their day in court.
GREGORY G. GORDON
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